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Towards Nondelegation Doctrines
Chad Squitieri*

ABSTRACT
When discussing the nondelegation doctrine, courts and scholars
frequently refer to Congress’ “legislative power.” The Constitution, however,
speaks of no such thing. Instead, the Constitution vests a wide variety of
“legislative powers” (plural) in Congress, including the powers to “regulate
commerce,” “declare war,” “coin money,” and “constitute tribunals.”
Shoehorning Congress’ diverse array of powers into a one-size-fits-all
nondelegation doctrine has necessitated the development of the vaguely
worded “intelligible principle” test. Unsurprisingly, that malleable test has
failed to produce a judicially manageable standard. In response, this Article
proposes that the nondelegation doctrine be transformed into a series of
nondelegation doctrines, each corresponding to one of Congress’ distinct
powers. Adopting such an approach can lessen the risk that reviving the
nondelegation principle – a task the current Supreme Court has expressed an
interest in taking on – will result in a complete reworking of the modern
administrative state.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When discussing the nondelegation doctrine, courts and scholars
frequently speak of Congress’ “legislative power.”1 The Constitution,
however, speaks of no such thing. Instead, the Constitution speaks of
“the judicial power,”2 “the executive power,”3 and “[a]ll legislative
powers herein granted.”4 Working from the presumption that there is a
difference between a “power” (singular) and “powers” (plural), this
Article argues that the nondelegation doctrine should be transformed into
a series of nondelegation doctrines, each corresponding to one of the
distinct powers vested in Congress.
Many of Congress’ powers are enumerated in Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution.5 There, Congress is vested with the powers to, among
other things, “regulate commerce,”6 “declare war,”7 “coin money,”8 and
“constitute tribunals.”9 Constitutional amendments vest Congress with
additional powers – for example, the “power to enforce [the voting rights
granted in the Fifteenth Amendment] by appropriate legislation,” 10 and
the power to “by law provide for” an orderly procedure to replace the
President or Vice President in the event of removal, resignation, or
incapacitation.11 Given the wide variety of subjects covered by
Congress’ powers, it should come as no surprise that the quest to capture
all of Congress’ powers within a single nondelegation doctrine has
proven to be a failure.12
See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019) (“The
nondelegation doctrine bars Congress from transferring its legislative power to
another branch of Government.”); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co.,
287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932) (“[T]he legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated . .
. .”); Julian Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 279–280 (2021) (arguing that there was no nondelegation at
the Founding if “legislative power” is defined in one of four ways); Ilan Wurman,
Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 YALE L.J. 1490, 1494 (2021) [hereinafter
Wurman, Founding] (“[M]uch of the earlier [nondelegation] literature focuses on . . .
the meaning of the term ‘legislative power’ . . . .”).
2
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
3
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
4
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
5
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
6
U.S. CONST. art I. § 8, cl. 3.
7
U.S. CONST. art I. § 8, cl. 11.
8
U.S. CONST. art I. § 8, cl. 9.
9
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
10
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
11
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
12
The Supreme Court has only twice relied on the nondelegation doctrine to
hold a statute unconstitutional, both times in 1935. Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 318 (2000). As one scholar put it, the
1
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By “failure,” I refer to the modern nondelegation doctrine’s
inability to produce a judicially manageable standard.13 That failure is
not attributable to a lack of trying – courts and scholars have undertaken
Herculean efforts to provide meaning to the nondelegation doctrine’s
“intelligible principle” test.14 The failure can instead be traced to the root
of the modern nondelegation doctrine, which focuses not on the
particular powers vested in Congress, but on the abstract conception of
“legislative power” more generally.
A one-size-fits-all nondelegation doctrine focusing on “legislative
power” (singular) necessitates that courts speak in vague and unhelpful
terms – thus, the intelligible principle test.15 Any effort to replace that
test with another single test, such as one asking whether Congress has
delegated the authority to decide “important” policy questions,16 is an
effort destined to similarly fail. The problem at the core of such tests is
that they ask courts to engage in freewheeling policy considerations. Put
differently, determining which policy questions are “important,” or
whether Congress’ instructions are sufficiently “intelligible,” are policy
questions approaching nonjusticeability.17
nondelegation doctrine “has had one good year,” and over 200 “bad ones.” Id. at
322. 200 “bad ones.” Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
315, 322 (2000).
13
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415–16 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the nondelegation doctrine “is not an element readily
enforceable by the courts” as it comes down to “a debate not over a point of
principle but over a question of degree”); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original
Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 361 (2002) [hereinafter Lawson, Original Meaning]
(“Justice Scalia flees from [the current nondelegation doctrine’s intelligible principle
test] as a vampire flees garlic.”); Michael B. Rappaport, A Judicially Manageable
Nondelegation Doctrine, THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (Dec. 17, 2020),
https://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2020/12/a-judiciallymanageable-nondelegation-doctrinemike-rappaport.html [https://perma.cc/GN3WRMBF] (“While Scalia was unwilling to have the courts enforce the doctrine,
advocates of a strict judicially enforced nondelegation doctrine have also admitted
that it would be difficult to draw the line between constitutional and unconstitutional
delegations of policymaking discretion.”).
14
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermuele, Libertarian Administrative
Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 415 & n.95 (2015) (collecting sources).
15
Infra Part II.A.
16
See, e.g., Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note 13, at 361 (“The line
between legislative power and executive or judicial power thus turns, in close cases,
on whether the function in question involves ‘important subjects’ or matters of ‘less
interest.’”); Wurman, Founding, supra note 1, at 1556 (concluding that “originalists
might . . . have to . . . focus more on an ‘important subjects’ theory” of
nondelegation).
17
See Chad Squitieri, Who Determines Majorness?, 44 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 463, 495–513, 515 (2021) (explaining why a “majorness” or “importance”
inquiry is incompatible with the judicial task when performed in the merits context).
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In this Article, I offer a two-part proposal. First, the single
nondelegation doctrine should be replaced with a series of nondelegation
doctrines, each applying to a different congressional power. Second,
each nondelegation doctrine should be developed by interpreting specific
constitutional provisions to mean what the public originally understood
them to mean at the time the provisions were enacted.
To be sure, one need not adopt the second part of my proposal to
adopt the first. Those who object to interpreting text pursuant to its
original public meaning, and those who prefer other nondelegation tests
– such as the intelligible principle or important subjects tests – can accept
the first part of my proposal alone. Put differently, one might be
convinced of the benefits of transforming a single doctrine into multiple
doctrines, but decide to develop those multiple doctrines by using
different interpretive methods—such as a law and economics method, or
a method of interpretation pursuant to which text is better able to take on
new meaning over time. Those alternative methods could vastly improve
the current nondelegation doctrine. But in this Article, I use a historicalbased approach to develop multiple doctrines—in part because that
approach might be attractive to the current Supreme Court (which seems
poised to revive the nondelegation principle in potentially problematic
ways), and in part because recent nondelegation scholarship has
exhibited a focus on historical evidence.
Fully developing nondelegation doctrines for each of Congress’
powers will require more historical research than can be offered here.
Entire articles can (and should) be dedicated to determining the original
public meaning of each power. I invite such scholarship by introducing
and defending the idea that the original public meaning of each of
Congress’ powers speaks not only to the subjects Congress can address
(e.g., what is “commerce” and “war”), but also to the extent Congress
can delegate its authority to address those subjects (e.g., who can
“regulate” commerce or “declare” war).
Rather than review all delegations under a single nondelegation
doctrine, different delegations should be reviewed under different
nondelegation doctrines. And the relevant doctrines should not be
derived from judicial dicta or the latest political science literature.
Instead, the doctrines should be derived from the Constitution’s text and
history. Thus, when it comes to the “legislative powers” vested in
Congress by Article I, Section 8, the relevant nondelegation question
concerns whether a particular delegation would have been considered a
“necessary and proper” means “for carrying [the relevant Article I,
Section 8 power] into execution,” as understood by the objective reader
in 1788.18 By comparison, when it comes to the power vested in
Congress by the Fifteenth Amendment, the relevant nondelegation
18

U.S. CONST. art I § 8, cl. 18.
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question includes a consideration as to whether an objective reader in
1870 would have understood a particular delegation to have been an
“appropriate” way for Congress to “enforce” the Fifteenth Amendment’s
voting rights.19
Parts II.A and II.B will discuss the current state of the
nondelegation doctrine by briefly describing the intelligible principle test
and its failure to produce a judicially manageable standard. Part II.C will
then situate this Article within an active scholarly debate discussing the
existence (or nonexistence) of the nondelegation doctrine at the time of
the Founding. That debate has helpfully uncovered important evidence
exhibiting narrow (and broad) delegations made by early Congresses.
This evidence is helpful, but its limits must be recognized: the evidence
only speaks to particular delegations of particular powers. By attempting
to leverage power-specific evidence into larger arguments in favor of the
existence (or nonexistence) of a single nondelegation doctrine, scholars
on both sides of the present debate go too far.
In response to the present debate, Part III proposes the development
of multiple nondelegation doctrines. These text-centric doctrines require
a closer parsing of the relevant text and history than has been called for
in present literature. In proposing nondelegation doctrines, Part III
provides textual analyses of Congress’ original legislative powers, other
powers vested in Congress by the Constitution as originally ratified, and
additional powers vested in Congress by constitutional amendments.
Each of those powers requires the application of a different
nondelegation doctrine.
Finally, Part IV provides three defenses of nondelegation doctrines.
Part IV.A explains how developing multiple nondelegation doctrines can
serve as a modus vivendi between those who see a revived nondelegation
doctrine as a tool to significantly rein in an overgrown federal
government and those who fear that a revived nondelegation would spell
disaster for the modern administrative state. Part IV.B responds to the
anticipated critique that developing multiple nondelegation doctrines will
not succeed in providing judicially manageable standards but will instead
only exaggerate the problem by requiring courts to apply multiple
unmanageable standards. Part IV.B then argues that the development of
nondelegation doctrines makes a feature out of what might otherwise be
seen as a flaw in current doctrine – numerous historical examples
illustrating disparate applications of nondelegation principles.

II. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that “[a]ll
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
19

U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
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United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.”20
Drawing upon the reference to “[a]ll” such
legislative powers, the nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from
delegating its legislative powers to other entities, including
administrative agencies.21 At its core, the nondelegation doctrine seeks
to enforce the people’s choice to vest legislative authority in a politically
accountable Congress.22 Today, the nondelegation doctrine permits
Congress to delegate decision-making discretion to agencies so long as
the agency’s discretion is cabined by an “intelligible principle” set by
Congress.23

A. The Intelligible Principle Test
“[T]he Constitution does not speak of ‘intelligible principles.’”24
Nevertheless, the phrase first entered the judicial lexicon in 1928 and has
come to play an outsized role in constitutional jurisprudence.25 In J. W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,26 the Supreme Court considered a
challenge to a “flexible” tariff provision of the Fordney–McCumber
Tariff Act of 1922.27 That provision permitted the President to increase
or decrease statutorily set tariffs upon making certain findings relating to
production costs.28 The President exercised his authority by increasing
20

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
Id.; see also Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225,
1241 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (recognizing Article I, Section
1 as an “exclusive” grant of power, and noting that “[w]hen the Court speaks of
Congress improperly delegating power, what it means is Congress’ authorizing an
entity to exercise power in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution”).
22
Some scholars trace the doctrine back three centuries to one of John
Locke’s constraints on legislative power. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna
Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1297 (2003).
23
Sunstein & Vermuele, supra note 14, at 414 (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., and
Co. v United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
24
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
25
J.W. Hampton, Jr., 276 U.S. at 409.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 400 (citing 42 Stat. 858).
28
Id. In making the necessary findings, the President was to consider “(1) the
differences in conditions in production, including wages, costs of material, and other
items in costs of production of such or similar articles in the United States and in
competing foreign countries; (2) the differences in the wholesale selling prices of
domestic and foreign articles in the principal markets of the United States; (3)
advantages granted to a foreign producer by a foreign government, or by a person,
partnership, corporation, or association in a foreign country; and (4) any other
advantages or disadvantages in competition.” Id. at 401–02 (quoting § 315(c) of
Title III of the Tariff Act of 1922).
21
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tariffs applicable to imported barium dioxide in order to offset
differences between foreign and domestic production costs.29 J.W.
Hampton, which had paid the increased tariff on imported barium
dioxide, argued that the flexible tariff provision constituted an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the President.30
In rejecting J.W. Hampton’s nondelegation argument, the Court
explained that although “the difference” in domestic and foreign
production costs “is difficult to fix with exactness,” Congress’ instruction
to the President that he adjust tariffs to account for that difference was
“perfectly clear and perfectly intelligible.”31 Expanding upon that
principle in more general terms, the Court stated that “[i]f Congress shall
lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person
or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”32
After J.W. Hampton, the Court next mentioned the intelligible
principle test in 1935, when the Court first relied on the nondelegation
doctrine to hold a delegation unconstitutional.33 In that case, Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan,34 the Court considered a provision in the National
Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”) purporting to prohibit the
transportation of oil produced in excess of quotas set by “order of the
President.”35 Pursuant to that authority, the President approved a “Code
of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry.”36 Oil industry plaintiffs
sued to prevent the enforcement of the code, arguing that the Recovery
Act constituted “an unconstitutional delegation to the President of
legislative power.”37
In considering the challenge, the Court observed that Congress had
not “establishe[d]” any “criterion to govern the President’s course,” nor
had Congress “declare[d]” any “policy as to the transportation of the
excess production.”38 Instead, Congress had provided “the President an
unlimited authority to determine the policy” himself, thereby
“commit[ting] to the President the functions of a legislature rather than
those of an executive.”39 After quoting Chief Justice Taft’s reference to

29

Id. at 403.
Id. at 400, 404.
31
Id. at 404.
32
Id. at 409.
33
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432–33 (1935).
34
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
35
Id. at 406 (1935) (quoting § 9 (c) of Title I of the National Industrial
Recovery Act).
36
Id. at 408–09.
37
Id. at 411.
38
Id. at 415.
39
Id. at 415, 418.
30

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss4/7

8

Squitieri: Towards Nondelegation Doctrines

2021]

TOWARDS NONDELEGATION DOCTRINES

1247

“intelligible principle[s],” the Court held NIRA’s delegation of authority
to be unconstitutional.40
A few months later, the Court considered another NIRA provision
in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States.41 Pursuant to
that provision, the President had approved a “Live Poultry Code.”42 The
government then brought indictments under the code, including one for
the selling of “an unfit chicken.”43 In considering whether Congress
could delegate the authority to promulgate the code, the Court “look[ed]
to the statute to see” if Congress had “itself established the standards of
legal obligation, thus performing its essential legislative function, or, by
the failure to enact such standards, has attempted to transfer that function
to others.”44 Because the NIRA offered few guiding principles to limit
the President’s discretion, the Court invalidated the code as resulting
from an unconstitutional “delegation of legislative power.”45
Not since 1935 has the Supreme Court held a delegation of power
unconstitutional pursuant to the nondelegation doctrine.46 That is not to
say that doctrine has ceased to exist – far from it. One scholar has
referred to the doctrine as the “Energizer Bunny of constitutional law,”
because “[n]o matter how many times it gets broken, beaten, or buried, it
just keeps on going and going.”47 The nondelegation doctrine’s
“remarkable staying power” was on display, for example, in Whitman v.
American Trucking Association.48 Although the Court in Whitman
rejected a nondelegation challenge to provisions of the Clean Air Act,49
Justice Thomas suggested that the nondelegation doctrine still had life
left to be lived – even if in a different form.50 As Justice Thomas wrote:
The parties to these cases who briefed the constitutional issue
wrangled over constitutional doctrine with barely a nod to the text of
the Constitution. Although this Court since 1928 has treated the
“intelligible principle” requirement as the only constitutional limit on

40

Id. at 429–30, 433.
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
42
Id. at 521, 523 (referring to § 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act).
43
Id. at 528.
44
Id. at 530.
45
Id. at 495, 551.
46
See generally id.
47
Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note 13, at 330. Other scholars have
noted this phenomenon in less welcoming terms. See, e.g., Mortenson & Bagley,
supra note 1, at 278 (“Like a bad penny, the nondelegation doctrine keeps turning
up.”).
48
531 U.S. 457 (2001); Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note 13, at 332.
49
Id. at 485–86 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)).
50
Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring).
41
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congressional grants of power to administrative agencies, the
Constitution does not speak of “intelligible principles.”51

It followed that, “[o]n a future day,” Justice Thomas “would be
willing to address the question whether our delegation jurisprudence has
strayed too far from our Founders’ understanding of separation of
powers.”52
The atextual nature of the intelligible principle test was also
referenced in Gundy v. United States.53 Like in Whitman, the Court in
Gundy rejected a nondelegation challenge.54 But in a dissenting opinion,
Justice Gorsuch – joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas –
explained that the modern intelligible principle test “has no basis in the
original meaning of the Constitution, in history, or even in the decision
from which it was plucked.”55 The three justices expressed a desire to
“revisit” how much legislative authority Congress can “hand[] off” to the
executive branch.56 In a brief concurrence, Justice Alito noted that he
too would “support th[e] effort” to “reconsider[]” the intelligible
principle doctrine in a different case.57 After joining the Court several
months later, Justice Kavanaugh wrote that his colleagues’ desire to
revisit the nondelegation doctrine “raised important points that may
warrant further consideration in future cases.”58 These opinions, which
account for five noses on the current Supreme Court, point towards a
shared conclusion: the atextual intelligible principle test is living on
borrowed time.

B. No Judicially Manageable Standard
As noted above, several sitting justices have taken issue with the
intelligible principle test on the grounds that the test is unmoored from
the Constitution’s text.59 Another complaint lodged at the intelligible
principle test is that after nearly 100 years, the test has failed to produce

51

Whitman, 531 U.S. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Id.
53
139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
54
Id. at 2121.
55
Id. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“This mutated version of the
‘intelligible principle’ remark has no basis in the original meaning of the
Constitution, in history, or even in the decision from which it was plucked.”).
56
Id. at 2131.
57
Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
58
Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (Justice Kavanaugh) (mem.).
59
See supra notes 48–49, 52–53 and accompanying text.
52
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a judicially manageable standard.60 This criticism was most notably
advanced by Justice Scalia in Mistretta v. United States.61
At issue in Mistretta was whether Congress could delegate to the
United States Sentencing Commission the authority to promulgate
sentencing guidelines.62 While the Court upheld the statute against a
nondelegation challenge, Justice Scalia dissented “because of a technical
quirk in the design of the Sentencing Commission’s authority.”63
Specifically, he complained that “[t]he lawmaking function of the
Sentencing Commission is completely divorced from any responsibility
for execution of the law or adjudication of private rights under the law,”
resulting in the creation of “a sort of junior-varsity Congress.”64
Although Justice Scalia would have held the statute unconstitutional on
those grounds alone, he took the opportunity to critique the intelligible
principle test.65
As Justice Scalia explained, “a certain degree of discretion, and thus
of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action, and it is up to
Congress, by the relative specificity or generality of its statutory
commands, to determine – up to a point – how small or how large that
degree shall be.”66 Thus, “while the doctrine of unconstitutional
delegation is unquestionably a fundamental element of our constitutional
system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the courts.” 67 As one
scholar explained, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Mistretta “all but came out
and said that the nondelegation doctrine is nonjusticiable – that the line
drawing it requires is not a legal analysis at all, but is instead political
(because it is discretionary) at its core.”68
Justice Scalia’s Mistretta dissent reveals that his objection to the
“unconstitutional delegation” doctrine, as he then called it, was an
60

See Michael B. Rappaport, A Two Tiered and Categorical Approach to the
Nondelegation Doctrine 12 (San Diego Legal Stud. Paper, Paper No. 20-471, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3710048
[https://perma.cc/M4L8-T924] [hereinafter Rappaport, Two Tiered] (“One of the
most serious charges against a strict nondelegation doctrine is that it does not
provide a judicially manageable test.”).
61
488 U.S. 361, 413–427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62
Id. at 362 (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. IV)).
63
Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note 13, at 329.
64
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 420, 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65
Id. at 416–27.
66
Id. at 417.
67
Id. at 415.
68
William K. Kelley, Justice Scalia, The Nondelegation Doctrine, and
Constitutional Argument, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2118 (2017); see also
Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note 13, at 354 (“[Justice Scalia] made clear [in
Mistretta] that he regards the degree of discretion to be vested in administrators as
essentially a political question that cannot (at least in the normal run of cases) be
evaluated by courts.”).
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objection to the intelligible principle test and its failure to provide a
judicially manageable standard.69 It was not an objection to the more
general idea that Congress is limited in its ability to delegate its
constitutionally vested powers. This is consistent with his broader
judicial philosophy. Pursuant to that philosophy, Justice Scalia “was a
fierce proponent of the Court’s staying the hand of judicial power and
deferring to the outcome of the political process” where “the
Constitution, properly understood, left a decision to the realm of
discretionary judgment.”70 But he “was equally confident in the exercise
of judicial power when he concluded that the Constitution, again
properly understood, ruled out of bounds the outcome of the political
process.”71
In the wake of the intelligible principle test’s failure to produce a
judicially meaningful standard, many scholars have offered various
proposals to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine in new form.72 I
wish to here highlight one of those proposals, the “important subjects”
test, as I believe that test to be just as unlikely as the intelligible principle
test to produce a judicially manageable standard.73
The important subjects test can be traced back to Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in Wayman v. Southard.74 That case concerned the
1792 Process Act, which established that federal courts would adopt the
judicial processes prevailing in state supreme courts, “subject however to
such alterations and additions as the [federal] courts respectively shall in
their discretion deem expedient, or to such regulations as the supreme
court of the United States shall think proper from time to time by rule to
prescribe to any circuit or district court concerning the same.”75 The
defendant in Wayman objected to this delegation of authority, arguing
that “[a]ll the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress,” and
that Congress “cannot delegate such power to the judiciary.”76
In considering the nondelegation challenge, Chief Justice Marshall
explained that Congress could not delegate “exclusively legislative”
powers.77 Elaborating on his conclusion, Chief Justice Marshall
distinguished between “those important subjects, which must be entirely
69

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416.
Kelley, supra note 68, at 2107.
71
Id.
72
See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 378 (2014).
73
Indeed, even Gary Lawson, a proponent of the important subjects test,
acknowledges that “[a]s constitutional tests go, this one certainly sounds pretty
lame—not to mention absurdly referential.” Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note
13, at 361.
74
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
75
Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (emphases added).
76
Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 13.
77
Id. at 42–43.
70
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regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a
general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act
under such general provisions to fill up the details.”78
Relying on Wayman, some scholars have proposed that Chief
Justice Marshall’s important subjects replace the intelligible principle
test.79 In general, these proposals would have it such that Congress may
delegate the authority to decide issues of “less interest,” but not delegate
the authority to decide “important subjects.”80 I have elsewhere argued
that this type of importance inquiry is incompatible with a proper
understanding of the judicial task because it calls on courts to engage in
freewheeling policy considerations.81 I double down on that argument
here.
An issue thought “unimportant” by one group might be thought
“important” by another. Determining relative importance is thus a task
appropriately exercised by the political branches, not courts. Like
identifying intelligibility in Mistretta, determining a delegation’s relative
“importance” involves “a debate not over a point of principle but over a
question of degree.”82 And it goes without saying that the term
“important subjects” is found nowhere in the Constitution. It follows,
then, that the “important subjects” test – which is derived from judicial
dicta rather than the Constitution, and which necessitates unconstrained
considerations of policy – is a poor substitute to replace the failed
“intelligible principle” test.

C. Turning to History
After decades of attempting to define how “intelligible” is
“intelligible” enough, recent nondelegation scholarship has focused on a
topic that courts are better equipped to consider: historical evidence.83
78

Id. at 43.
See, e.g., Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note 13, at 361 (“The line
between legislative power and executive or judicial power thus turns, in close cases,
on whether the function in question involves ‘important subjects’ or matters of ‘less
interest.’”); Wurman, Founding, supra note 1, at 1556 (concluding that “originalist
scholars . . . might . . . have to . . . focus more on an ‘important subjects’ theory” of
nondelegation); Rappaport, Two Tiered, supra note 60, at draft 1 (referring to the
important subjects test as the “leading existing approach to a strict nondelegation
doctrine”).
80
See, e.g., Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) at 43.
81
Squitieri, supra note 17, at 495–513, 515.
82
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415–16 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
83
Philip Hamburger, Delegating or Divesting, 115 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 88,
88 (2020) (“A gratifying feature of recent scholarship on administrative power is the
resurgence of interest in the Founding.”); Wurman, Founding, supra note 1, at 1494
(“[M]uch of the earlier literature focuses on constitutional structure, the meaning of
79
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This turn to history has no doubt been motivated by Justice Gorsuch’s
Gundy dissent, which one scholar described as a dissent likely to
“launch[] a hundred law-review ships.”84 Here I will briefly describe a
few key pieces of scholarship, each of which marshals historical
evidence in an attempt to establish the existence (or nonexistence) of the
nondelegation doctrine at the time of the Founding.
Positioned on one end of the debate are Julian Davis Mortenson and
Nicholas Bagley, who contend that “[t]here was no nondelegation
doctrine at the Founding, and the question isn’t close.”85 To support their
conclusion, Mortenson and Bagley begin their argument by placing the
burden on those who would conclude the opposite.86 “[O]riginalists,” the
pair argues, “ought to be able to point to consistent concrete, and specific
evidence” of the nondelegation doctrine being invoked at the Founding.87
Mortenson and Bagley go on to offer a thorough canvassing of Founding
era sources.88
Most notable is the evidence Mortenson and Bagley present
regarding the First Congress.89
Mortenson and Bagley address
legislation concerning federal territories, commercial regulations,
interactions with Native Americans, social welfare and entitlement
benefits, finance and budget, tax assessment and enforcement, and
citizenship.90 They aim to show that the First Congress delegated broad
grants of discretion relating to each of those subjects.91
Mortenson and Bagley note, for example, that the First Congress
enabled a territorial governor and judges to “adopt and publish in the
[territory], such laws of the original States, criminal and civil, as may be
the term ‘legislative power,’ and the normative and theoretical reasons to have a
nondelegation doctrine. The recent contributions force scholars to confront another,
perhaps more direct, source of evidence or original meaning: the actual statements
and practices of those first operating under the new federal Constitution.”).
84
Adam White, Nondelegation’s Gerrymander Problem, YALE J. ON REGUL.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/nondelegationsgerrymander-problem/ [https://perma.cc/F2Q8-N79J]; see also Christine Kexel
Chabot, Nondelegation at the Founding? What James Madison Told the First
Congress, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT, (July 19, 2020),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/nondelegation-at-the-founding-what-james-madisontold-the-first-congress-by-christine-kexel-chabot/ [https://perma.cc/7MWS-YKJV]
(“Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy has inspired somewhat of an originalist
renaissance and a flurry of invaluable scholarship addressing delegation in the
founding era . . . .”).
85
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 367.
86
Id. at 293.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 289–349.
89
Id. at 332–49.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 349.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss4/7

14

Squitieri: Towards Nondelegation Doctrines

2021]

TOWARDS NONDELEGATION DOCTRINES

1253

necessary, and best suited to the circumstances of the [territory].”92
They also highlight a statute authorizing the President “to identify any of
his soldiers who were ‘wounded or disabled while in the line of his duty
in public service,’ and put them on ‘the list of the invalids of the United
States, at such rate of pay, and under such regulations, as shall be
directed by the President of the United States, for the time being.’”93
Mortenson and Bagley posit that these examples, among others,
showcase Congress delegating broad authorities to the President during
the early years of the Republic.94
Mortenson and Bagley also address the debates that the Second
Congress had regarding its ability to delegate its constitutional power to
“establish . . . post roads.”95 As the pair of professors concedes, the post
road debates offer originalists “their best evidence . . . for the principle
that the nondelegation doctrine existed at the Founding.”96
The post roads debates began in December of 1791 when the House
of Representative’s considered a bill to establish the United States postal
system.97 Invoking Congress’ Article I power to “establish post offices
and post roads,”98 a committee of the Second Congress proposed a bill
outlining in detail which post routes should be established.99 In response,
Representative Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts introduced an
amendment to replace that detailed list of routes with a provision
referring to “such routes as the President of the United States shall, from
time to time, cause to be established.”100 When considered against the
detailed list of post routes contained in the original bill, Representative
92

Id. at 334 (quoting Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 50–51).
Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
94
Id. at 349.
95
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
96
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 350.
97
Id. (citing Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 232, 232).
98
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
99
Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 232, 232 (1792) (“That from and
after the first day of June next, the following roads be established as post roads,
namely: From Wisscassett in the district of Maine, to Savannah in Georgia, by the
following route, to wit: Portland, Portsmouth, Newburyport, Ipswich, Salem,
Boston, Worcester, Springfield, Hartford, Middletown, New Haven, Stratford,
Fairfield, Norwalk, Stamford, New York, Newark, Elizabethtown, Woodbridge,
Brunswick, Princeton, Trenton, Bristol, Philadelphia, Chester, Wilmington, Elkton,
Charlestown, Havre de Grace, Hartford, Baltimore, Bladensburg, Georgetown,
Alexandria, Colchester, Dumfries, Fredericksburg, Bowling Green, Hanover Court
House, Richmond, Petersburg, Halifax, Tarborough, Smithfield, Fayetteville,
Newbridge over Drowning creek, Cheraw Court House, Camden, Statesburg,
Columbia, Cambridge and Augusta; and from thence to Savannah, and from Augusta
by Washington in Wilkes county to Greenborough and from thence . . . .”); Wurman,
Founding, supra note 1, at 1506.
100
3 ANNALS OF CONG. 229 (1791).
93
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Sedgwick’s amendment constituted a broad delegation of authority to the
President.
The debates surrounding Representative Sedgwick’s
amendment thus offer a glimpse into how such delegations were
perceived by members of the Second Congress.
In response to Representative Sedgwick’s amendment,
Representative Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire noted “that the
Legislative body being empowered by the Constitution ‘to establish post
offices and post roads,’ it is as clearly their duty to designate the roads as
to establish the offices; and he did not think they could with propriety
delegate that power, which they were themselves appointed to
exercise.’”101 Representative Thomas Hartley of Pennsylvania added
that “[w]e represent the people, we are constitutionally vested with the
power of determining upon the establishment of post roads; and, as I
understand at present, ought not to delegate the power to any other
person.”102 James Madison noted “there did not appear to be any
necessity for alienating the powers of the House; and that if this should
take place, it would be a violation of the Constitution.”103 Other
representatives lodged similar objections, and Representative Sedgwick’s
amendment was ultimately rejected.104
The post roads debates are said to strengthen the argument of those
who would argue that a nondelegation doctrine existed at the time of the
Founding because the debates concluded with the rejection of a broad
delegation of a congressional power to the President.105
Although
Mortenson and Bagley acknowledge the significance of the objections to
Representative Sedgwick’s amendment, the duo discounts the objections
by noting that they “did not reflect a majority view among those present
and voting, much less a constitutional consensus.”106 Mortenson and
Bagley thus conclude that the post roads debates fail to offer sufficient
historical support for the nondelegation doctrine.107
Like Mortenson and Bagley, Christine Kexel Chabot argues that the
“originalist arguments” in favor of the nondelegation doctrine “find no
support in the understandings of delegation that prevailed in the
Founding era.”108 But where Mortenson and Bagley offer a wide
argument covering many statutes, Chabot offers a deep examination of a
101

Id.
Id. at 231.
103
Id. at 239.
104
Wurman, Founding, supra note 1, at 1506.
105
Id. at 1511; Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 350.
106
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 353.
107
Id. at 355.
108
Christine Kexel Chabot, The Lost History of Delegation at the Founding,
GA. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2021) (manuscript at 1), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3654564
[https://perma.cc/4QGC-DNEV].
102
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few key examples. Specifically, Chabot examines how the First
Congress exercised its powers to pay the national debt and regulate
patents.109
As to the national debt, Chabot details the 1790 Act Making
Provision for the [payment of the] debt of the United States.110 That Act
delegated to the President the authority to take out loans subject to only
two parameters: first, that the loans “not exceed” $12 million in total, and
second, that repayment occur within 15 years.111 With those two
parameters being the only relevant restrictions on the President’s
discretion, Chabot concludes the Act to have been a broad delegation of
power.112
As to the regulation of patents, Chabot contends that the Patent Act
of 1790 offered only “minimal legal standards . . . for examiners” to
follow, and that “Congress left other large gaps for the Patent Board to
address.”113 This too, Chabot argues, constitutes historical evidence of
Congress’ ability to broadly delegate authority to the Executive
branch.114 Chabot concludes by stating that “[t]he historical record of
legislation passed by early Congresses is one of broad delegation to
decide important questions,” meaning that “originalists searching for an
alternative to the intelligible principle doctrine have embarked on a futile
quest.”115
Ilan Wurman challenges the conclusions that Mortenson, Bagley,
and Chabot draw from the historical record.116 To do so, Wurman
marshals a detailed collection of affirmative evidence in favor of the
nondelegation doctrine, noting that “that Mortenson and Bagley have not
come close to demonstrating their claim that there was no nondelegation
doctrine at the Founding.”117 “Although the history is messy,” Wurman
argues, “there is significant evidence that the Founding generation
adhered to a nondelegation doctrine, and little evidence that clearly
supports the proposition that the Founding generation believed that
Congress could freely delegate its legislative power.”118

109

Id. at manuscript 18–42.
Id. at manuscript 19 (referring to Act Making Provision for the Debt of the
United States, ch. 34, 1 Stat. 138 (1790).
111
Id. at manuscript 28 (referring to Act Making Provision for the Debt of the
United States, ch. 34, 1 Stat. 138 (1790).
112
Id. at manuscript 27–31.
113
Id. at manuscript 38.
114
Id. at manuscript 36.
115
Id. at manuscript 50.
116
Wurman, Founding, supra note 1, at 1497.
117
Id. at 1493–94.
118
Id. at 1494.
110
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Prominent amongst Wurman’s affirmative evidence are the post
roads debates.119 Also prominent are the debates surrounding the Alien
Friends Act, within which “Madison argue[d] that if a law were so vague
and undefined, that might work an unconstitutional transfer of legislative
power to another department.”120
Wurman also offers evidence
surrounding lesser known debates, such as a bill which would have
authorized the President to raise an army of up to 10,000 men, leaving
the ultimate number to the President’s discretion.121 In objecting to that
bill, a representative noted that if the Congress “could delegate the power
of raising an army to the President, why not do the same with respect to
the power of raising taxes?”122 The implication left by that objection, of
course, is that Congress could delegate neither power to the President.123
Another representative confirms that implication, explaining that the bill
“would be unconstitutional” because “it delegates Legislative powers to
the President.”124
Wurman further defends his position on the nondelegation doctrine
by highlighting Founding era arguments made outside of Congress, such
as those arguments outlined in the Federalist Papers.125 In Federalist No.
62, for example, James Madison described one advantage of a bicameral
119

Id. at 1506–13.
Id. at 1512–14. The Alien Friends Act authorized “the President . . . to
order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the
United States” to depart the country. An Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570
(1798). Madison argued against the Act, noting that:
120

However difficult it may be to mark, in every case, with clearness and
certainty, the line which divides legislative power, from the other
departments of power; all will agree, that the powers referred to these
departments may be so general and undefined, as to be of a legislative, not of
an executive or judicial nature; and may for that reason be unconstitutional.
Details, to a certain degree, are essential to the nature and character of a law;
and, on criminal subjects, it is proper, that details should leave as little as
possible to the discretion of those who are to apply and to execute the law. If
nothing more were required, in exercising a legislative trust, than a general
conveyance of authority, without laying down any precise rules, by which
the authority conveyed, should be carried into effect; it would follow, that
the whole power of legislation might be transferred by the legislature from
itself, and proclamations might become substitutes for laws. A delegation of
power in this latitude, would not be denied to be a union of the different
powers.

James Madison, Virginia Report of 1800.
121
Wurman, Founding, supra note 1, at 1514–15 (referring to An Act
authorizing the President of the United States to raise a provisional army, ch. 47, 1
Stat. 558 (1798)).
122
8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1526–27.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1535.
125
Wurman, Founding, supra note 1, at 1523-35. (referring to THE
FEDERALIST NOS. 37, 47, 53, 55 (James Madison)).
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legislature as being that “[n]o law or resolution can now be passed
without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a
majority of the States.”126 Wurman contends that the advantage Madison
ascribes to a bicameral legislation “would be entirely eliminated if
Congress could freely delegate its legislative power to the Executive.”127
In the end, Wurman concludes that the historical record leans in favor of
his position that the nondelegation doctrine was alive and well at the
founding: “In contrast to the abundant evidence that is at least
suggestive of a nondelegation doctrine,” he writes, “the direct evidence
that the founding generation believed there was no limit to what
Congress could delegate is scant.”128
Other scholars have also entered the fray, providing historical
evidence they perceive as either supporting or undermining the argument
that nondelegation principles were present at the Founding.129 And of
course, the present debate is being held atop a foundation developed by
scholars such as Gary Lawson,130 Michael Rappaport,131 Larry
Alexander,132 and Saikrishna Prakash.133
This Article need not decide which of the above scholars has the
best read on history. To the contrary, I contend that all of the scholars
mentioned above might be right as to different legislative powers. But
the various historical examples that these scholars highlight are only
126

THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961).
127

Wurman, Founding, supra note 1, at 1524.
Id. at 1526–27.
129
See, e.g., Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation, 12 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 718,
744–79 (2019) (collecting historical evidence supporting the argument that the
nondelegation doctrine has a firm foundation in the Constitution’s original meaning);
Nicholas R. Parrillo, A Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against
Administrative Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the Federal Tax on Private
Real Estate in the 1790s, 130 Yale L.J. 1288 (2021) (providing an in-depth account
of the “direct tax” of 1798, regarding which Congress empowered federal assessors
to assign taxable values to every house and farm in country and decide what each
was “worth in money,” a standard that the relevant legislation stated but did not
define).
130
See, e.g., Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note 13; Gary Lawson, Mr.
Gorsuch, Meet Mr. Marshall: A Private-Law Framework For the Public-Law Puzzle
of Subdelegation, (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Meet. Mr. Marshall],
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3607159&download=yes
[https://perma.cc/H6EN-NPZB].
131
See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and
the Line Item Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its
Implications for Clinton v. City of New York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265 (2001)
[hereinafter The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine]; Rappaport, Two Tiered, supra
note 60.
132
See, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, supra note 22, at 1297.
133
Id.
128

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

19

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [2022], Art. 7

1258

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

examples speaking to particular legislative powers. It is a mistake to
treat evidence speaking to particular powers as evidence speaking to all
of Congress’ powers. Such a one-size-fits all understanding of
nondelegation fails to account for the Constitution’s actual text, which
speaks not of some generalized “legislative power,” but which instead
vests specific powers in Congress.

III. INTRODUCING NONDELEGATION DOCTRINES
As an alternative to the current nondelegation doctrine, Part III
proposes that separate nondelegation doctrines be developed for each of
Congress’ powers. In particular, Part III proposes that to develop
nondelegation doctrines, courts (assisted by scholars and the adversarial
process) should determine the original public meaning of each of
Congress’ powers, including what that meaning says about Congress’
ability to delegate each power. One need not accept that constitutional
provisions should be interpreted pursuant to their original public
meaning in order to agree that multiple nondelegation doctrines
(corresponding to each of Congress’ powers) should be created. Part III,
however, outlines how multiple nondelegation doctrines can be created
by utilizing an original public meaning approach.
The judicial task proposed below requires courts to identify how an
objective reader would have answered key nondelegation questions at the
time Congress was vested with each power. Courts and scholars should
apply these key nondelegation questions (derived below) when
considering the constitutionality of specific delegations. In applying
these key nondelegation questions, individual nondelegation doctrines
can be developed over time.

A. Powers Not Power
The Constitution contains twenty-two references to “power,” and
thirteen references to “powers.”134 Many of those references vest power
in Congress; this Article will examine each one that does.135 The
analysis begins with Article I, Section 1, which provides:
134

See generally U.S. CONST.
The other references to “power” or “powers,” which are not examined in
detail in this Article, include: a reference to “foreign power,” U.S. CONST. art. I, §
10, cl. 3; “the executive Power,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; multiple references to the
President’s “powers and duties,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; U.S. CONST. amend.
§§ III, IV; the President’s power to “to grant Reprieves and Pardons,” U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 1; the President’s power “to make Treaties,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2; the President’s power to “to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the
Recess of the Senate,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3; three references to “the judicial
Power,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST.
135
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All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.136

Note the difference in wording between that legislative vesting
clause and the vesting clauses for the executive and judicial powers,
which respectively provide:
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.137
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.138

The conspicuous use of “The” in the latter two vesting clauses (i.e.,
“The” executive power and “The” judicial power) suggest references to
terms of art, the meaning of which were fixed at the time of the
Constitution’s ratification.139 It has thus been argued that “[i]f an activity
amend. XI; and the “powers” reserved to the several states, U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Also not examined is the ability for state legislatures to “empower” state governors
to make “temporary appointments” to the U.S. Senate, until such time that the
vacancies are filled “by election as the legislature may direct.” U.S. CONST. amend.
XVII, § 1, cl. 2.
Also outside the scope of this Article are the House’s “sole power of
impeachment,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; the Senate’s “sole Power to try all
Impeachments,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; and the Senate’s “Advice and
Consent” powers relating to the making of treaties and the appointment of
“Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Those
powers, although vested in a single chamber of Congress, are not powers vested in
Congress. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring The Nondelegation
Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1755 (2002) (“[T]he treaty approval power is
held by the Senate as a separate institution, not by the Congress. Precedent from
both the Supreme Court and Congress itself has always recognized that distinction.”)
(citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955–56 (1983)). Although these powers are
worthy of future scholarly attention, in this Article, I focus on those constitutional
powers vested in Congress, with more limited references to other powers when
appropriate.
136
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
137
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
138
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
139
John Harrison, Enumerated Federal Power and the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1101, 1109 (2011) (“To understand the judicial power
conferred by Article III, it is common to look to the practices of the English courts
that were known to the Framers. It is also a standard, though controversial, move to
look to the King’s authority in understanding the President’s authority, and
specifically in understanding the executive power referred to in Article II.”); see also
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falls within the late eighteenth-century understanding of ‘executive’ or
‘judicial’ power, the President or the federal courts are presumptively
authorized to engage in that activity.”140
Examining the precise contours of the executive and judicial powers
is beyond the scope of this Article. My immediate point is only that,
while mapping the limits of presidential and judicial power may require
determining the original public meaning of “The” executive power and
“The” judicial power in their entirety, mapping the limits of Congress’
powers requires determining the original public meanings of each of the
different congressional powers enumerated in the Constitution.141
Recognizing Congress as having been vested with only certain
legislative powers is consistent with the Constitution’s structure and
history.142 Although the Founders took care to ensure that power was not
concentrated in any one branch of federal government,143 the Founders
were particularly concerned with concentrating power in Congress.144 As
James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 51, “[i]n republican government,
the legislative authority necessarily predominates.”145 The specific
attention given to the legislative branch was in part due to a legislature’s
natural incentive to “draw[] all power into its impetuous vortex” by

Ilan Wurman, In Search of Prerogative, 70 DUKE L. J. 93, 133–37 (2020)
[hereinafter Wurman, Prerogative] (examining the differences between the
Constitution’s three vesting clauses).
140
Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note 13, at 337–38; see also Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 231, 240 (referring to “our holding that the
judicial power unalterably includes the power to render final judgments” and stating
that “[t]he Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial powers denies
[Congress] the authority” to “set aside a final judgment”); but see Mortenson &
Bagley, supra note 1, at 55 (arguing that at the time of the Founding “executive
power had an extremely thin meaning: the authority to execute instructions and
prohibitions as formulated by some prior exercise of legislative power.”).
141
The full text of Article I § 1 is not always given the attention it deserves.
Justice Stevens, for example, once explained that “[i]n Article I, the Framers vested
‘All legislative Powers’ in the Congress, just as in Article II they vested the
‘executive power” in the President.” Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531
U.S. 457, 489 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring). Crucially, in making that
comparison, Justice Stevens left out the portion of Article 1 § 1 referring to “herein
granted.” Id.
142
See generally U.S. CONST. art. I.
143
Mortenson and Bagley, supra note 1, at 293 (“The Founders divided power
in this manner because both their own experience and the best political science of the
era left them with serious concerns about the excessive consolidation of
governmental authority.”).
144
Id. at 332.
145
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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“everywhere extending the sphere of its activity.”146 To prevent a
tyrannical federal legislature, the Founders were careful to first split
Congress into two chambers, and to then vest the bicameral body with
only a limited selection of powers.147 Most obviously, Congress was not
vested with the authority to exercise the more general legislative
authorities exercisable by the several states.148
Having acknowledged that Congress is vested only with specifically
enumerated powers, the next task is to identify the specific powers
Congress was vested with. Recall that Article I, Section 1 refers to “[a]ll
legislative powers herein granted.”149 The reference to “herein granted”
could either be a reference to the powers granted in the Constitution
generally, or the powers granted in Article I specifically.150 To decide
between those two options, it is helpful to review how the Constitution
uses the word “herein” in two other contexts.
Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 provides that “[n]o Capitation, or
other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or
enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”151 In that instance, the
word “herein” refers to Article I, Section 2, Clause 3, which provides in
part that “Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among
the several States which may be included within this Union, according to
their respective Numbers.”152 Thus, the reference to “herein” in Article I,
146

THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

147

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 321–25 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961).
1961).
148
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 497 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[T]he power of congress or in other words of the national
legislature, shall extend to certain enumerated cases. This specification of particulars
evidently excludes all pretension to a general legislative authority; because an
affirmative grant of special powers would be absurd as well as useless, if a general
authority was intended.”); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 64 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (referring to a “police power of the sort reserved to the States”). Two
exceptions, explained in greater detail in Part II.C, relate to Congress’ powers to
regulate as to the District of Columbia, and as to federal territories. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 17; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. In those two instances Congress has
broader grants of legislative authority, although such authority is geographically
limited. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
149
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
150
Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section I: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2118–20 (2004).
151
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (emphasis added). Note that the Sixteenth
Amendment changed the substantive meaning of this provision, although it does not
alter the use of the word “herein.” See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“The Congress
shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,
without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or
enumeration.”).
152
U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 3.
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Section 9, Clause 4 directs the reader to look elsewhere within Article I
specifically, not the Constitution generally.
The Constitution also uses the word “herein” in Article II,
Section 2, Clause 2:
[The President] shall . . . appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.153

In reference to that provision, Thomas Merrill has argued that “[t]he
most likely reference of ‘herein otherwise provided for’ would be the
Members of Congress, whose method of appointment is detailed in
Article I.”154 According to Merrill, then, Article II’s reference to
“herein” requires the reader to look to “the Constitution as a whole, not a
single article.”155
Merrill’s interpretation of the term “herein,” which comes in a
footnote and is only tangential to an otherwise meticulous analysis of
Article I, is not the best interpretation. The problem with Merrill’s
interpretation is that Article I does not speak to the “appointment” of
Members of Congress – it speaks to their election.156
Because Members of Congress are elected, not appointed, Article II,
Section 2, Clause 2’s reference to “Appointments . . . not herein
otherwise provided for” should not be understood as a reference to
Members of Congress.157 Instead, the use of “herein” in Article II,
Section 2, Clause 2 is best understood as a reference to Article II, Section
153

U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
Merrill, supra note 150, at 2136 n.157. Gary Lawson has made the same
point in passing. Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note 13, at 337 (“[Article I]
expressly confirms that Congress can exercise only those legislative powers
referenced elsewhere in the Constitution rather than any imaginable powers that bear
the label ‘legislative.’”).
155
Merrill, supra note 150, at 2136.
156
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 (“When vacancies happen in the
Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of
Election to fill such Vacancies.”) (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2
(“Immediately after [the Senate] shall be assembled in Consequence of the first
Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes.”) (emphasis
added); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof . . . .”) (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“Each
House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own
Members . . . .”) (emphasis added).
157
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
154
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2, Clause 2 itself.158 Specifically, when Article II, Section 2, Clause 2
states “herein,” it references the types of appointed officers mentioned
within the very same clause – i.e., “Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court.”159 Relevant scholarship and
Supreme Court precedent supports this conclusion.160
As the two examples noted above demonstrate, when the
Constitution uses the term “herein,” it does so to refer the reader to a
specific article, not the Constitution generally.161 It follows that the
reference to “herein” in Article I, Section 1 should similarly be
understood as a reference to the powers vested in Article I.162 In sum,
Article I’s vesting in Congress of the “legislative powers herein granted”

158

Id.
Id.
160
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co., 561 U.S. 477, 497–98 (2010) (“The people
do not vote for the ‘Officers of the United States.’ Art. II, §2, cl. 2. They instead
look to the President to guide the ‘assistants or deputies . . . subject to his
superintendence.’”) (quoting Federalist No. 72, p. 487 (J. Cooke ed.1961) (A.
Hamilton); United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 307 (1888) (“Unless a person in
the service of the government, therefore, holds his place by virtue of an appointment
by the president, or of one of the courts of justice or heads of departments authorized
by law to make such an appointment, he is not strictly speaking, an officer of the
United States.”); Josh Blackman & Seth Barrett Tillman, The Emoluments Clauses
litigation, Part 1: The Constitution’s taxonomy of officers and offices, WASH. POST
(Sept. 25, 2017, 10:04 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2017/09/25/the-emoluments-clauses-litigation-part-1-theconstitutions-taxonomy-of-officers-and-offices/
[https://perma.cc/5GH6-WCZP]
(“Under the canon of ejusdem generis, ‘all other Officers of the United States’
should be read to reference the same kind of executive and judicial branches officers
that the clause expressly lists. All these officers are appointed, not elected.”).
161
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Additionally, Article I, Section 8,
Clause 18 speaks to the existence of “other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof,” further
suggesting that the Constitution is capable of referring the reader to powers outside
of Article I when necessary. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 18.
162
Cary Coglianese, Dimensions of Delegation, 167 U. PA. L. REV., 1849,
1869 (2019) (contending that “herein granted” refers to “the enumerated powers
granted in Article I”). Indeed, even Merrill comes to interpret Article I, Section 1’s
use of “herein” as a reference to the enumerated powers found in Article I. Merrill,
supra note 151, at 2137. “[T]he overall structure of the Constitution makes more
sense,” he argues, “if we construe ‘herein’ in Article I . . . to refer only to Article I
itself.” Id. Interpreting it otherwise would have odd results, “[f]or example, the
President’s power to make treaties, set forth in Article II, seems to qualify as a type
of legislative power,” and “[i]t would be odd for the constitutional drafters to confer
‘all’ legislative powers on Congress in Article I, and then grant a specific type of
legislative power to the President in Article II.” Id. “The anomaly disappears,”
Merrill persuasively concludes, “if we read ‘herein granted’” to refer to the “powers
enumerated in Article I.” Id.
159

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

25

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [2022], Art. 7

1264

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

is a vesting of those legislative powers specifically enumerated in Article
I, Section 8.163

B. Congress’ Original Legislative Powers
Having determined that the original “legislative powers” vested in
Congress are located in Article I, Section 8, the next task in developing
nondelegation doctrines is to begin uncovering the original public
meanings of each power. Obtaining those original public meanings will
shed light not only on the subjects Congress can regulate (e.g., what is
“commerce” or “war”), but also the extent to which Congress can
delegate its authority to address those subjects (e.g., who can “regulate”
commerce or “declare” war).
Because Congress’ Article I, Section 8 powers are the first powers
to be analyzed in this Article, it is helpful to briefly outline the
mechanics of my proposal. Below I begin to outline key nondelegation
questions applicable to different categories of congressional powers. I
propose that these key nondelegation questions structure the necessary
historical analyses courts must engage in (as cases arise) to determine
whether any particular delegation of discretion is constitutional. By
applying the applicable key nondelegation questions to the different
delegations, crystalized nondelegation doctrines can develop over time.
My proposed project begins, then, with an analysis of Article I,
Section 8, which vests legislative powers in Congress through seventeen
individual clauses:
[1] The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
[2] To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
[3] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes;
[4] To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

163
James Madison shared this interpretation of Article I, Section 1. Alexander
& Prakash, supra note 22, at 1317 (noting that Madison “certainly regarded the
‘legislative powers’ mentioned in the Article I Vesting Clause as referencing the
legislative authorities granted in Article I, Section 8”) (citing James Madison, Letters
of Helvidius No. 1, in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 66, 67-68 (Phillip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987) and James Madison, Letters of Helvidius No. 2,
in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 69, 70 (Kurland & Lerner, eds., 1987).
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[5] To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin,
and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;
[6] To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities
and current Coin of the United States;
[7] To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
[8] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries;
[9] To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
[10] To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;
[11] To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
[12] To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to
that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
[13] To provide and maintain a Navy;
[14] To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces;
[15] To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
[16] To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the
Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
[17] To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over
such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat
of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like
Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature
of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.164

164

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1–17.
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Note the diversity of subjects addressed in those seventeen clauses.
The familiar power to “regulate Commerce,”165 for example, is listed
alongside the less familiar power to “punish Piracies.”166 The diverse
range of subjects addressed in Article I, Section 8 is a clue that
developing a single nondelegation doctrine constitutes a fool’s errand.
Note also the character of each of Congress’ Article I, Section 8
powers. As explained above, the Constitution refers to those powers as
“legislative powers.”167 But many of those powers – such as the power
to declare war and the power to organize, arm, and discipline the militia
– hardly seem “legislative,” at least not in the way a political scientist
might use the term. Indeed, as Michael McConnell has explained, many
of Congress’ powers historically belonged to the British monarch. 168
“The framers self-consciously analyzed each of the prerogative powers”
exercised by the Crown, McConnell explains, “but did not vest all (or
even most) of them in the American executive.”169 Instead, some of the
royal prerogatives “were vested in Congress.”170 Article I’s reference to
“legislative powers,” then, serves as something of a defined term
encompassing powers more naturally exercised by an executive. This
casts more doubt on the current nondelegation doctrine’s focus on the
abstract conception of “legislative power,” rather than the specific,
sometimes-executive-like powers that are actually vested in Congress.171
Deriving the key nondelegation question applicable to Congress’
Article I, Section 8 powers begins with a further review of Article I,

165

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
167
Supra Part III.A (interpreting “herein”).
168
MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD NOT BE KING:
EXECUTIVE POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 11 (2020).
169
Id.; see also Wurman, Prerogative, supra note 139, at 134 (“[T]he
[Constitutional] Convention arguably assigned Congress much more than just ‘the
legislative power.’”).
170
MCCONNELL, supra note 168, at 11.
171
Recognizing the executive-like nature of many of Congress’ powers
distinguishes this Article’s proposal from that offered by Cary Coglianese, pursuant
to which delegations are evaluated on six dimensions and then compared to the
dimensions of an Article I, Section 8 power. Coglianese, supra note 162, at 1851,
1863–70. Coglianese’s proposal (which focuses on the unique dimensions of a
“legislative” power) can be conceptualized as a middle approach between this
Article’s proposal (which focuses on the nature of each Congressional power but
does not consider how “legislative” that power might be) and the traditional
nondelegation doctrine (which focuses on “legislative power” in the abstract). See
id. at 1863 (describing “lawmaking authority” as consisting of six “distinct sticks or
features”); see also id. at 1865 (an unconstitutional delegation “must at minimum
authorize the making of law”). Thus, this Article’s proposal applies to all of
Congress’ powers, not just the “legislative” powers vested in Article I, Section 8.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
166
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Section 8 itself. Following the seventeen clauses listed above, Article I,
Section 8 contains an eighteenth clause providing:
[18] To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or
in any department or officer thereof. 172

This Necessary and Proper Clause provides the text-based standard
for determining how Congress can delegate its Article I, Section 8
powers.173 The key nondelegation question for the legislative powers
enumerated in Article I, Section 8 is therefore as follows:
Key Nondelegation Question for Article I, Section 8 Powers
Whether an objective reader in 1788 would have understood a
particular delegation to be a “necessary and proper” means of
“carrying” a particular Article I, Section 8 power “into execution.”
The objective reader is correctly positioned in 1788, the year that
the Necessary and Proper Clause and each Article I, Section 8 power was
ratified.174
Interpreting the relevant constitutional text from the
perspective of the objective reader in 1788 therefore promotes the FixedMeaning Canon, which holds that “[w]ords must be given the meaning
they had when the text was adopted.”175 Thus, to develop the
172

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
Gary Lawson has similarly identified the Necessary and Proper Clause as
providing the relevant nondelegation standard. Lawson, Original Meaning, supra
note 13, at 350 (“[I]f a fully informed eighteenth-century audience would have
viewed a statute purporting to authorize an executive agent to make laws as
‘improper,’ then Congress does not have the enumerated power to circumvent the
Constitution’s basic Article II and Article III limitations on executive and judicial
activity.”); id. at 351 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause “is in fact a
crucial textual vehicle through which the specific contours of the nondelegation
doctrine are constitutionalized”).
174
Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did The Constitution Become Law?,
77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 24 (2001) (“[T]he Constitution was properly ratified
when the necessary ninth state convention completed its work, which in this case
was 1:00 p.m. on June 21, 1788.”).
175
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 78 (West 2012); Interpreting texts from the
perspective of the objective reader is, of course, a central tenet of originalism. Id. at
69–77 (describing the Ordinary-Meaning Canon); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 2018) (“We look for a sort of
‘objectified’ intent-the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of
the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”); Frank H. Easterbrook,
173
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nondelegation doctrines applicable to Article I, Section 8 powers, a court
must ask what “necessary and proper” meant in 1788.
As most first year law students are aware, some evidence of the
original public meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause is found in
Chief Justice Marshall’s 1819 opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland.176 The
threshold issue in that case was whether Congress had the constitutional
authority to establish a national bank.177 Because the Constitution does
not explicitly vest such a power in Congress, debate turned to whether
Congress could establish a bank by relying on the Necessary and Proper
Clause.178 In interpreting that clause, Chief Justice Marshall announced
the test which has since become well-known: “Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.”179
Chief Justice Marshall’s interpretation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause has been described as expansive, as it permits Congress to make
laws that, although not strictly necessary, are “convenient or useful.”180
But some scholars have suggested that the original understanding of
Necessary and Proper Clause – ratified thirty years before McCulloch –
was much narrower.181 One competing understanding of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, for example, was advanced by James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson, who both distinguished “necessity” from
“convenience” in a way that Chief Justice Marshall arguably did not. 182
I do not here argue that Chief Justice Marshall, Madison, or
Jefferson had the better interpretation. But I do posit that, in determining
the degree to which Congress may delegate a particular power, a court
must do more than blindly assume that the dicta in McCulloch applies
The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
59, 61 (1988). (“Meaning comes from the ring the words would have had to a skilled
user of words at the time, thinking about the same problem.”).
176
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
177
Id. at 316.
178
Id. at 323–24.
179
Id. at 421.
180
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 220 (2003) (describing the “view attributed to
Marshall”).
181
Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, the “Proper” Scope of Federal
Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267,
286-89 (1993).
182
Barnett, supra note 180, at 193, 195–96 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1950
(Joseph Gales ed., 1791) and OPINION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, SECRETARY OF STATE,
ON THE SAME SUBJECT (FEB. 15, 1791), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE AND
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, at 93 (M. St. Clair
Clarke & D.A. Hall eds., Augustus M. Kelley 1967)).
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equally to each of Congress’ diverse powers; additional historical
research is required. For the purposes of advancing my argument,
however, I will momentarily assume without deciding that Chief Justice
Marshall’s familiar understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause is
the same understanding that an objective reader would have assigned to
that clause in 1788. But as is central to my proposal, delegations deemed
“necessary and proper” to carry one power into execution may not be
“necessary and proper” to carry another power into execution.
Consider a preliminary application of the above-proposed key
nondelegation doctrine question to Article I, Section 8, Clause 5, which
provides Congress with three separate powers: (1) The power “[t]o coin
Money”; (2) the power to “regulate the Value [of such Money], and of
foreign Coin”; and (3) the power to “fix the Standard of Weights and
Measures.”183 An initial analysis suggests that an objective reader in
1788 understood Congress as being able to delegate each of those powers
differently.
It is unlikely, for example, that the objective reader understood
Congress’ power to “coin money” as requiring legislators to personally
press copper over an open flame. The discretion inherent in exercising
that power (e.g., how hot to make the flame) could be delegated to
others.
By comparison, an objective reader likely would have
understood Congress as being perfectly able to “regulate the value” of
such coins without it being “necessary and proper” to delegate any
authority to others.184 The 1792 Coinage Act provides some evidence
suggesting that these initial analyses are correct.185
The 1792 Coinage Act delegated to the “Director of the Mint” the
authority to “employ as many clerks, workmen, and servants as he shall
from time to time find necessary.”186 Simultaneously, the Act set the
“value” of the coins that those workers would produce.187 Put
183

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
Id.
185
Coinage Act of April 2, 1792, ch.16, 1 Stat. 246 (1792).
186
§ 2.
187
§ 9. (“That there shall be from time to time struck and coined at the said
mint, coins of gold, silver, and copper, of the following denominations, values and
descriptions, viz. Eagles—each to be of the value of ten dollars or units, and to
contain two hundred and forty-seven grains and four eighths of a grain of pure, or
two hundred and seventy grains of standard gold. Half eagles—each to be of the
value of five dollars, and to contain one hundred and twenty three grains and six
eights of a grain of pure, or one hundred and thirty five grains of standard gold.
Quarter Eagles—each to be of the value of two dollars and a half dollar, and to
contain sixty-one grains and seven eighths of a grain of pure, or sixty-seven grains
and four eighths of a grain of standard gold. Dollars or Units—each to be of the
value of a Spanish milled dollar as the same is now current, and to contain three
hundred and seventy-one grains and four sixteenth parts of a grain of pure, or four
hundred and sixteen grains of standard silver, Half Dollars—each to be of half the
184
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differently, Congress delegated broad discretion when it came to the task
of physically producing coins, but delegated narrow discretion in setting
the value of those coins.188 Congress also delegated narrow discretion
when it first exercised its power to “fix the Standard of Weights and
Measures” in 1828.189
Congress delegated these three powers
differently, and in ways that likely aligned with what the objective reader
in 1788 would have considered “necessary and proper.” To be sure, the
1792 Coinage Act is just one example – and I’ve only scratched the
surface of the relevant historical record. But the preliminary application
above shows how the key nondelegation question applicable to
Congress’ Article I, Section 8 powers can be applied in practice.

C. Congress’ Other Original Powers
As ratified in 1788, the Constitution vested powers in Congress
through provisions found outside of Article I as well. First is the
Territorial Clause of Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, which provides:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States.

value of the dollar or unit, and to contain one hundred and eighty-five grains and ten
sixteenth parts of a grain of pure, or two hundred and eight grains of standard silver.
Quarter Dollars—each to be of one fourth the value of the dollar or unit, and to
contain ninety-two grains and thirteen sixteenth parts of a grain of pure, or one
hundred and four grains of standard silver. Dismes—each to be of the value of one
tenth of a dollar or unit, and to contain thirty seven grains and two sixteenth parts of
a grain of pure, or forty one grains and three fifth parts of a grain of standard silver.
Half Dismes—each to be of the value of one twentieth of a dollar, and to contain
eighteen grains and nine sixteenth parts of a grain of pure, or twenty grains and four
fifth parts of a grain of standard silver. Cents—each to be of the value of the one
hundredth part of a dollar, and to contain eleven penny-weights of copper. Half
Cents—each to be of the value of half a cent, and to contain five penny-weights and
half a penny-weight of copper.”).
188
See Edwin Vieira, Jr., Forgotten Role of the Constitution in Monetary Law,
2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 77, 110 (1997) (arguing that Congress was “crystal clear” in
setting the value unit of the money system).
189
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5; ARTHUR H. FRAZIER, UNITED STATES
STANDARDS OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 (1978), available at
https://repository.si.edu/bitstream/handle/10088/2439/SSHT-0040_Hi_res.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XBL8-DPES]. The power had gone unexercised up until 1828,
likely because congressmen succumbed to local pressures advocating for the
continued use of disparate, state-set weights. Id. When Congress finally exercised
its power in 1828, Congress did so not by delegating discretion to, say, a Board of
Weights and Measurements. Instead, Congress explicitly identified a particular
“brass troy pound weight” to serve as a uniform standard. See Act to Continue the
Mint at the City of Philadelphia § 2 ((1821).
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Second is Article III, Section 3, Clause 2, which provides:
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of
Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood,
or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.190

As noted in Part II.A, these extra-Article I powers are not the
“legislative powers” referred to in Article I, Section 8.191 Nonetheless,
these extra-Article I powers are subject to the limitation imposed by the
Necessary and Proper Clause,192 which is not limited to Congress’
Article I, Section 8 powers, but instead applies to “all . . . powers vested
by this Constitution.” 193 The key nondelegation question applicable to
the extra-Article I powers delegated in the original Constitution is
therefore the same question applicable to Congress’ Article I, Section 8
powers:
Key Nondelegation Question for Congress’ Other Original
Powers
Whether an objective reader in 1788 would have understood a
particular delegation to be a “necessary and proper” means of
“carrying” a particular power “into execution.”
Like the key nondelegation question applicable to Congress’ Article
I, Section 8 powers, the question applicable to Congress’ other original
powers requires interpreting the Constitution from the perspective of the
objective reader in 1788 – the year the Necessary and Proper Clause and
the extra-Article I powers originally vested in Congress were ratified.194
To see how this key nondelegation question can be applied in
practice, consider first the Territorial Clause of Article IV. Beginning
with the Northwest Territory, Congress has long relied on its Territorial
Clause power to establish territorial governments by statute.195 The
190
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. See supra note 118 for
other examples of powers vested in Congress outside of Article I.
191
See also Wurman, Prerogative, supra note 139, at 134 (“[T]he
[Constitutional] Convention arguably assigned Congress much more than just ‘the
legislative power.’”).
192
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.18.
193
Id. (emphasis added).
194
Lawson & Seidman, supra note 174, at 24.
195
1 Stat. 50 (1789) (Northwest); 1 Stat. 123 (1790) (Southwest); 1 Stat. 549
(1798) (Mississippi); 2 Stat. 58 (1800) (Indiana); 2 Stat. 283 (1804) (Orleans); 2
Stat. 309 (1805) (Michigan); 2 Stat. 331 (1805) (Louisiana); 2 Stat. 514 (Illinois); 2
Stat. 743 (1812) (Missouri); 3 Stat. 371 (1817) (Alabama); 3 Stat. 493 (1819)
(Arkansas); 3 Stat. 654 (1822) (Florida); 5 Stat. 10 (1836) (Wisconsin); 5 Stat. 235
(1838) (Iowa); 9 Stat. 323 (1848) (Oregon); 9 Stat. 403 (1849) (Minnesota); 9 Stat.
446 (1850) (New Mexico); 9 Stat. 453 (1850) (Utah); 10 Stat. 172 (1853)
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creation of these territorial governments is a means for Congress to
exercise its authority over far-flung corners of the continent (and
beyond).196 This was particularly important at the time of the
Constitution’s ratification, when communicating with distant territories
was difficult.197
The Territorial Clause thus responds to these
geographical difficulties by permitting Congress to empower territorial
governors, legislatures, and courts to govern geographic terrain that
Congress could not itself govern directly.198
Given geographical realities, it is likely that the objective reader in
1788 would have understood Congress’ early statutes establishing
territorial governments as being “necessary and proper” means for
Congress to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting” the
territories.199 Mortenson and Bagley, however, offer a competing view.
The duo contends that Congress’ establishing of territorial governments
constitutes evidence that no nondelegation doctrine (for any power)
existed at the time of the Founding. 200 Arguing that Congress’ Territorial
Clause power is “legislative —just like the powers enumerated in Article
I,” Mortenson and Bagley state that “[i]f originalists are right that
Congress can’t delegate its Article I authority to ‘regulate Commerce,’ it
should follow that Congress also can’t delegate its Article IV power to
make ‘needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory.’” 201
Respectfully, Mortenson and Bagley are mistaken on two grounds.
First, the power exercised by territorial governments is territorial power;
territorial governments do not exercise federal power (legislative or
otherwise).202 Thus, Congress does not delegate its Territorial Clause
power to territorial governments. Instead, Congress exercises its
Territorial Clause power when it creates territorial governments that (in

(Washington); 10 Stat. 277 (1854) (Kansas); 10 Stat. 277 (1854) (Nebraska); 12 Stat.
172 (1861) (Colorado); 12 Stat. 209 (1861) (Nevada); 12 Stat. 239 (1861) (Dakota);
12 Stat. 664 (1863) (Arizona); 12 Stat. 808 (1853) (Idaho); 13 Stat. 85 (1864)
(Montana); 15 Stat. 178 (1868) (Wyoming); 26 Stat. 81 (1890) (Oklahoma); 31 Stat.
141 (1900) (Hawaii); 37 Stat. 512 (1912) (Alaska).
196
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
197
How Did People Communicate in the 1700s?, Reference,
https://www.reference.com/history/did-people-communicate-1700sf522b0825da9b118 [https://perma.cc/CH8Z-R9B8] (March 27, 2020).
198
U.S. CONST. ART. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
199
U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 18; id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
200
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 333–38.
201
Id. at 336.
202
Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S.
Ct. 1649, 1651 (2020) ) (“[W]hen Congress creates local offices using these two
unique powers, [i.e., the Territorial Clause and Article I, Section 8, Clause 17, which
refers to what is now the District of Columbia] the officers exercise power of the
local government, not the Federal Government.”).
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turn) enact, enforce, and adjudicate territorial laws.203 As Justice
Thomas explained after a thorough review of the historical evidence,
“the First Congress recognized the distinction between territorial and
national powers.”204 It follows that Congress’ establishing of territorial
governments does not constitute evidence of the nonexistence of a single
nondelegation clause.
Instead, Congress’ establishing territorial
governments is better understood as a straightforward exercise of
Congress’ Territorial Clause power.
Second, even if Mortenson and Bagley were to disagree with Justice
Thomas and argue that there is no distinction between federal and
territorial power, they still go too far in arguing that Congress’
establishing territorial governments constitutes evidence that there was
no nondelegation doctrine at the time of the Founding. At best,
Congress’ alleged “delegations” of federal legislative authority to
territorial governments would only be evidence speaking to how
Congress can delegate the power vested by the Territorial Clause. It
would not be evidence speaking to how Congress can delegate powers
vested by other clauses.
As was previously noted, there are practical reasons for Congress to
have the ability to delegate authority to far-flung territories.205 Those
reasons do not apply to other powers vested in Congress. So even if the
nondelegation doctrine applicable to the Territorial Clause allowed
“delegations” of Congress’ Territorial Clause power, it would not follow
that other nondelegation doctrines applicable to other powers would
allow for similar delegations. Each power must be considered in its own
context.
Consider another example involving the other extra-Article I
congressional power quoted above, which vests in Congress the “Power
to declare the Punishment of Treason.”206 In the Crimes Act of 1709,
Congress exercised that power with fatal precision: “[S]uch person or
persons [who] shall be adjudicated guilty of treason against the United
States . . . shall suffer death.”207 More recently, Congress has exercised
203

A similar relationship exists between Congress and the District of
Columbia, which Congress has empowered to exercise local authority pursuant to
Congress’ power “[t]o exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over
[the District of Columbia].” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. As Part II.A
demonstrated, the proper nondelegation doctrine as to federal statutes granting the
local D.C. government the authority to enact local laws is whether such federal
statutes are a “necessary and proper” means for Congress to carry out its Article I,
Section 8, Clause 17 power.
204
Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1670 (Thomas, J., concurring).
205
See supra notes 197–199 and accompanying text.
206
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
207
1 Stat. 112, 112 (1790). The judiciary’s involvement in “adjuciat[ing]”
such treason charges does not raise a serious nondelegation challenge, since the
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its declaratory power by establishing that those guilty of treason “shall
suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined
under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of
holding any office under the United States.”208
As compared to the Crimes Act of 1709, the modern statute
declaring the punishment for treason leaves more discretion to the
President and the courts.209 In 1709, the punishment was clearly set by
Congress: If you were adjudicated guilty, you were to be sentenced to
death.210 Today, lawyers within the executive branch can propose to a
court whether a fine, imprisonment or execution is an appropriate
punishment for a particular defendant.211 I take no position as to whether
leaving such discretion constitutes an impermissible delegation of
Congress’ power to “declare” the punishment for treason. Instead, I note
that the relevant framework for determining a nondelegation challenge to
the modern statute would be to consider whether, in the eyes of the
objective reader in 1788, the discretion granted in the modern statute is a
“necessary and proper” means of “carrying out” Congress’ power to
declare the punishment of treason.212 That inquiry, which is focused

Constitution elsewhere notes that “[n]o person shall be convicted of Treason unless
on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same over Act, or on Confession in open
Court.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. Put differently, Congress must “declare” the
penalty for treason, but may then permit the courts to determine if the crime of
treason has occurred. Id.
208
18 U.S.C. § 2381.
209
Id.
210
1 Stat. 112 (1790).
211
U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL: PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
PROSECUTION § 9-27.730, available at https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-27000principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.730 [https://perma.cc/8DKG-BWBY].
212
Answering that question will require examining historical evidence
speaking to, among other things, the discretion executive officials had in 1788 to
make charging decisions, and how those charging decisions were permissibly shaped
by legislation. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. McGinnis and Rappaport have
suggested that the historical understanding of prosecutorial discretion would allow
for broad delegations of power. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The
Power of Interpretation: Minimizing the Construction Zone, 96 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 919, 950 (2021) (“Prosecutorial discretion is one of these specific areas where
the executive enjoyed significant discretion. Consequently, if the Congress
conferred authority on the President to adopt his nonenforcement program, this
action would have been well within any limits on Congress’s constitutional
power.”); see also Staphanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 1011 (2009) (citing Akhil Reed Amar, The
Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L. J. 1131, 1189 (1991)) (discussing the
role of prosecutors at the Founding); Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion
Power at Its Zenith: The Power to Protect Liberty, 97 B.U. L. REV. 489, 497–501
(2017) (discussing the history of prosecutorial discretion in early America).
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upon a particular constitutional provision, involves little need to map the
vague outlines of a generalized conception of “legislative power.”

D. The Sixteenth Amendment
This Article has so far examined powers originally vested in
Congress by the Constitution as ratified in 1788. Constitutional
amendments, however, vest additional powers in Congress. Many of
those amendments vest in Congress the power to “enforce” the
amendment by “appropriate legislation.”213 Other amendments vest in
Congress the power to provide for something “by law.”214 Both of those
categories of amendments will be examined in turn. But it is helpful to
first discuss the Sixteenth Amendment, which utilizes unique language
for an amendment, and which can be examined in isolation. The
Sixteenth amendment provides:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to
any census or enumeration.215
The key nondelegation question applicable to the Sixteenth
Amendment is therefore as follows:
Key Nondelegation Question For The Sixteenth Amendment
Whether an objective reader in 1788 would have understood a
particular delegation to be a “necessary and proper” means of
“carrying into execution” the taxing power vested in Congress by the
Sixteenth Amendment, as that power was understood by an objective
reader in 1913.
The Sixteenth Amendment’s key nondelegation question, like the
questions applicable to Congress’ original powers, asks for a
consideration of what the objective reader would have considered
“necessary and proper” in 1788.216 That consideration is (again) derived
from the Necessary and Proper Clause, which applies to “all . . . powers
vested by this Constitution.”217 When the Sixteenth Amendment was

213
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIIV, § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5;
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
214
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4, cl.
1.
215
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
216
Id.
217
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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ratified, it became a “power[] vested by this Constitution,” and thus
became a power subject to the limitations imposed by the Necessary and
Proper Clause.218
Unlike the key nondelegation questions applicable to Congress’
original powers, the Sixteenth Amendment’s nondelegation key question
includes an additional consideration. Namely, it requires a court to
consider what the objective reader in 1913 (the year the Sixteenth
Amendment was ratified) understood the Sixteenth Amendment as
empowering Congress to do. It can be said, then, that the Sixteenth
Amendment’s nondelegation doctrine requires courts to engage in a bit
of interpretive time traveling.219
By “time traveling,” I mean that the Sixteenth Amendment’s key
nondelegation question requires a court to consider the constitutionality
of a delegation from the perspective of objective readers positioned at
two different points in time – 1913 (the year the Sixteenth Amendment
was ratified) and 1788 (the year the Necessary and Proper Clause was
ratified). This task was unnecessary when examining Congress’ original
powers because those powers were vested in Congress in 1788, the same
year the Necessary and Proper Clause was ratified.220
In applying the Sixteenth Amendment’s key nondelegation question
to determine if a particular delegation is constitutional, a court should
begin by considering the scope of the Sixteenth Amendment as
understood by the objective reader in 1913. If the delegation in question
concerned a levying of a tax on real property, for example, the court
could readily determine that the delegation was improper pursuant to the
Sixteenth Amendment, which only empowers Congress to tax
“incomes.”221 If, however, the delegation at hand appears to fall within
the original public meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment (e.g., a
delegation of discretion to a federal tax agent to calculate income), the
court must then consider whether the delegation was a “necessary and
proper” means of “carrying” the Sixteenth Amendment power “into
execution,” as that “necessary and proper” limitation was understood by
the objective reader in 1788.

218

See Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801,
1811 (2010).
219
See Erik M. Jensen, Did the Sixteenth Amendment Ever Matter? Does it
Matter Today?, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 799, 803 (2014).
220
See U.S CONST. art. 1 § 8 cl. 18.
221
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The delegation may, however, be permissible
pursuant to Congress’ Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 power to “lay and collect
Taxes.” U.S CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 2.
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E. Appropriate Legislation Powers
Several amendments vest in Congress the power to “enforce” an
amendment by “appropriate legislation.” A full accounting of these
“appropriate legislation” powers is as follows:
[The Thirteenth Amendment, ratified in 1865, provides:] Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. . . .
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.222
[The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, provides:] No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. . . . Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.223
[The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1879, provides:] The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude. . . . Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.224
[The Eighteenth Amendment, ratified in 1919 and repealed in 1933,
provides:] After one year from the ratification of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the
importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United
States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage
purposes is hereby prohibited. . . . Congress and the several states
shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.225

222

U.S. CONST. amend. XII (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
224
U.S. CONST. amend. XV (emphasis added).
225
U.S. CONST. amend. XIIX (emphasis added).
The Eighteenth Amendment utilizes unique language in that it vests a power
“concurrently” in Congress and the several states. Id. at § 2. Shortly after the
amendment’s ratification, Justice McReynolds referred to the Eighteenth
Amendment as a “bewilderment.” Noel T. Dowling, Concurrent Power under the
Eighteenth Amendment, 6 MINN. L. REV. 447, 447 (1922) (quoting National
Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 392 (1920) (McReynolds, J. concurring)). Justice
McReynolds’ bewilderment was justified, as a “concurrent power in two distinct
sovereignties to regulate the same thing is as inconsistent in principle as it is
223
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[The Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, provides:] The right
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any state on account of sex. . . . Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.226
[The Twenty Third Amendment, ratified in 1961, provides:] The
District constituting the seat of government of the United States shall
appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct: . . . A number of
electors of President and Vice President . . . and they shall meet in
the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article
of amendment. . . . Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.227

impracticable in action. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 399 (1849) (The Eighteenth
Amendment utilizes unique language in that it vests a power “concurrently” in
Congress and the several states.). It involves a moral and physical impossibility. Id.
A joint action is not supposed, and two independent wills cannot do the same thing.
Id. The action of one, unless there be an arrangement, must necessarily precede the
action of the other; and that which is first, being competent, must establish the rule.
Id. If the powers be equal; as must be the case, both being sovereign, one may undo
what the other does, and this must be the result of their action.” Id.
One can imagine a circumstance where a delegation made by Congress
pursuant to the Eighteenth Amendment was found to have unconstitutionally
interfered with the concurrent power vested in the states. In light of the Eighteenth
Amendment’s repeal I will not here seek to fully explore such circumstances. But I
do note that any such limitation on Congress’ ability to delegate its eighteenth
Amendment authority would be a limitation unique to the Eighteen Amendment’s
concurrently vested powers. This, I posit, further highlights my broader argument
that one must independently review the substance of each of Congress’ powers to
conclude how Congress can delegate any particular power. It would be wrong to
blindly conclude that a limitation on Congress’ ability to delegate its concurrently
vested Eighteenth Amendment power is a limitation that also applies to any other
power vested in Congress. The peculiar language associated with each of Congress’
powers must be given an independent review.
226
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (emphasis added).
227
US. CONST. amend. XIII (emphasis added). The Twenty Third Amendment
utilizes relatively unique language in that the amendment provides Congress with the
power to “direct” the government of the District of Columbia to appoint electors.
US. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The Twenty Third Amendment then vests in
Congress the power to “enforce” its power to “direct” the government of the District
of Columbia “by appropriate legislation.” US. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. Such
language results from Congress’ supervisory relationship with the government of the
District of Columbia. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (vesting in Congress the power
to “exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over” the District of
Columbia). The power vested in Congress by the Twenty Third Amendment
resembles the power constitutionally vested in state legislatures to appoint electors.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . . .”).
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[The Twenty Fourth Amendment, ratified in 1964, provides:] The
right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other
election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or
Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason
of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. . . . Congress shall have
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.228
[The Twenty Sixth Amendment, ratified in 1971, provides:] The right
of citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to
vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state
on account of age. . . . Congress shall have the power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.229

By vesting in Congress the power to “enforce” an amendment by
“appropriate legislation,” the above-quoted amendments call for a more
complicated nondelegation question than the questions applicable to
either the Sixteenth Amendment or the powers vested in Congress by the
Constitution as ratified in 1788. The complication arises because, as
previously noted, the Necessary and Proper Clause applies to “all . . .
powers vested by this Constitution,”230 including those powers added to
the Constitution by amendments.
The “appropriate legislation” amendments do not, for example, vest
in Congress the power to “prohibit slavery.”231 Instead, Congress is
vested with the more awkwardly worded power to “enforce [a
prohibition on slavery] by appropriate legislation.”232 Thus, the key
nondelegation question for Congress’ “appropriate legislation” powers
becomes:
Key Nondelegation Question For Congress’ “Appropriate
Legislation” Powers
Whether an objective reader in 1788 would have understood a
particular delegation to be a “necessary and proper” means of
“carrying into execution” a power, as the power was understood by an
objective reader at the time the power was vested by a particular
amendment, to “enforce” the amendment by “appropriate legislation.”
I readily concede that this key nondelegation question constitutes a
bit of a mouthful. There is some reason to believe that it could
(eventually) be shortened by removing the underlined reference to
228

U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (emphasis added).
230
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
231
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
232
U.S. CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
229
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“appropriate legislation.” But as explained below, additional historical
research will be needed to justify that removal.
The case for removing the reference to “appropriate legislation”
from the above-proposed nondelegation question rests on the argument
that the “appropriate legislation” inquiry captures the same “necessary
and proper” inquiry derived from the Constitution as ratified in 1788.
Evaluating the historical accuracy of that argument begins with a
consideration of the Reconstruction era following the Civil War. During
that era, Congress enacted three Reconstruction Amendments – the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.233 The Thirteenth
Amendment was the first amendment to utilize the term “appropriate
legislation.”234 The term was then repeated in the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.235
As Jack Balkin explains, “[t]he framers of the Reconstruction
Amendments assumed that the McCulloch test would apply to Congress’
new Reconstruction Powers, and that the use of the term ‘appropriate’ in
the text of all three enforcement clauses reflects this assumption.”236
Other scholars agree with Balkin,237 and their view is consistent with the
view espoused by the Supreme Court during the Civil Rights
Movement.238
During the Civil Rights Movement, Congress enacted landmark
civil rights statutes grounded in the Reconstruction Amendments.239 In
Katzenbach v. Morgan,240 the Court explained that “the McCulloch v.
Maryland standard is the measure of what constitutes ‘appropriate
legislation’ under [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”241 The
Court similarly connected the term “appropriate legislation” to the

233

See John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 375 (2001).
234
U.S. CONST. amend. XIIV, § 2.
235
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
236
Balkin, supra note 218, at 1810; see also id. at 1815 (“My point here is not
simply that the Reconstruction Congress expected that courts would apply the test of
McCulloch; the point, rather, is that the language of McCulloch is actually embedded
in the text of Section 5, and, given the structural purposes of the Reconstruction
Amendments, there is no good textual or structural reason to give Congress a
narrower power.”).
237
Id. at n. 34 (collecting sources).
238
Id. at 39 (collecting sources).
239
See, e.g., Nw. Austin Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S.
193, 217–18 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“There is
certainly no question that the [Voting Rights Act of 1965] initially ‘was passed
pursuant to Congress’ authority under the Fifteenth Amendment.’”) (quoting Lopez
v. Moterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)).
240
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
241
Id. at 651.
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McCulloch test in other cases involving other Reconstruction
Amendments.242
It is logical enough to presume, then, that different objective readers
– although positioned at the different moments in time when each
amendment was ratified – would each interpret “appropriate legislation”
to mean the same thing it meant when it was first ratified in the
Thirteenth Amendment. Indeed, giving the term a consistent meaning
across the Constitution’s amendments might even be defended by
reference to the Presumption of Consistent Usage.243 But before
concluding the reference to “appropriate legislation” may be properly
removed from the key nondelegation question proposed above, it is
necessary to consider a second possibility. Particularly, it is necessary to
consider the possibility that objective readers positioned at different
points in time interpreted “appropriate legislation” differently – or, at
minimum, interpreted the term differently than Chief Justice Marshall
interpreted the Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch.
Recall that McCulloch was decided in 1819 – thirty years after the
ratification of the original Constitution. 244 Further recall that scholarship
suggests that Chief Justice Marshall’s interpretation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause was incorrect, in the sense that a different meaning applied
to the clause at the time it was ratified in 1788. 245 Also consider that,
over time, the Supreme Court has changed its view as to whether
constitutional references to “appropriate legislation” adopt the
McCulloch test. In City of Boerne v. Flores,246 for example, “[t]he
Supreme Court abruptly changed course” from its previous holdings
establishing that “appropriate legislation” incorporated the McCulloch
test.247 The City of Boerne Court instead “held that Congress’s

242

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968) (citing McCulloch
test as standard for congressional power under Thirteenth Amendment); City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) (“[U]nder § 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment Congress may prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not violate
§ 1 . . . so long as the prohibitions attacking racial discrimination in voting are
‘appropriate,’ as that term is defined in McCulloch v. Maryland and Ex parte
Virginia . . .); Balkin, supra note 218, at 1811 n.39 (collecting sources).
243
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 175, at 70 (“A word or phrase is presumed
to bear the same meaning throughout a text; a material variation in terms suggests a
variation in meaning.”).
244
Barnett, supra note 180, at 198.
245
Id. at 220–21
246
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
247
Balkin, supra note 218, at 1812 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997)); see also Harrison, Enumerated Federal Power and the Necessary and
Proper Clause, supra note 139, at 1126 (“The Court in City of Boerne v Flores
prominently cited M’Culloch but did not connect its test under § 5 to Chief Justice
Marshall’s descriptions of power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. The
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enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment were
limited to remedies that were ‘congruen[t] and proportional[]’ to the
Supreme Court’s view of what violates the Fourteenth Amendment.”248
These disparate interpretations of “necessary and proper” and
“appropriate legislation” suggest that the latter term may not have always
been understood as capturing the same test attributable to the former.
Depending on the year an amendment was ratified, the objective reader
might have understood “appropriate legislation” as adopting the
“necessary and proper” test proposed by Madison, Jefferson, or Chief
Justice Marshall; or the objective reader might have thought “appropriate
legislation” presented an entirely new test, such as the “congruent and
proportional” test later pronounced in City of Boerne.
To muddy the waters even more, note that identifying the original
public meaning of each constitutional reference to “appropriate
legislation” requires identifying what the objective reader reasonably
understood the term “appropriate legislation” to mean. That inquiry is
distinguishable from determining whether the objective reader had a
“correct” read on 18th century history – although this later determination
may constitute an important data point. Put differently, an objective
reader at the time a particular “appropriate legislation” amendment was
ratified might have thought the term was a reference to Chief Justice
Marshall’s “necessary and proper” test – even if an objective reader in
1788 would have thought that Chief Justice Marshall’s test was a poor
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause. In that scenario, the
Constitution’s multiple references to “appropriate legislation” might be
thought as “locking in” Chief Justice Marshall’s (incorrect) interpretation
of the Necessary and Proper Clause. If so, Chief Justice Marshall’s test
would be inapplicable to the Necessary and Proper Clause, but
applicable to all (or more confusingly, some) of the Constitution’s
references to “appropriate legislation.”
All of this is to say that the objective reader, positioned at different
points in time, might have understood “appropriate legislation” to mean
slightly different things. Moreover, assigning different meanings to
different uses of the term “appropriate legislation” would not be

implication is strong that the requirement of congruence and proportionality is
stronger than that under the clause.”) (internal citations omitted).
248
Balkin, supra note 218, at 1812 (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520).
At least one notable originalist, Justice Thomas, has more recently confirmed this
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One
v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 225 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (explaining that for an act enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to be constitutional, “there must be a demonstrated connection between
the ‘remedial measures’ chosen and the ‘evil presented’ in the record made by
Congress when it renewed the [a]ct”) (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U. S. at 530).
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inconsistent with the Presumption of Consistent Usage.249 For one, the
Presumption of Consistent Usage is just that – a presumption; it can be
overcome when good sense demands it.250
And although the
presumption typically seeks to have terms interpreted consistently, the
presumption “is particularly defeasible by context,” and is more
persuasive when two instances of a repeated term were “enacted at the
same time, and dealt with the same subject.”251
Each “appropriate legislation” amendment was enacted at different
times, in different contexts, to address different subjects.252 The term
“appropriate legislation,” when used in the context of enforcing a
prohibition on slavery in 1865,253 might have been understood differently
than when the term was used in 1920 to vest in Congress the power to
enforce “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote” regardless of
“sex.”254 And the term “appropriate legislation” might have meant
something else in 1961, when Congress was vested with the power to
enact “appropriate legislation” to ensure that the District of Columbia
was awarded electors in the Electoral College.255
To be sure, it might be perfectly reasonable to presume that the
meaning of “appropriate legislation,” as understood in the Thirteenth
Amendment, is the same meaning that future objective readers assigned
to the term when it was repeated in later amendments. And it might be
that all of those references to “appropriate legislation” capture the same
test that Chief Justice Marshall assigned to the Necessary and Proper
Clause.256 If so, the key nondelegation question proposed above could be
shortened so as to not require an explicit analysis of the original public
meaning of each reference to “appropriate legislation.” The analysis
could instead focus on the substantive scope of the amendment invoked
to support a particular delegation, and whether the particular delegation
is a “necessary and proper” means of carrying Congress’ power to
“enforce” the amendment into execution. But absent a close review of
the historical records relating to each amendment, such a conclusion
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 175, at 70 (“A word or phrase is presumed
to bear the same meaning throughout a text; a material variation in terms suggests a
variation in meaning.”).
250
Id. at 59 (“No canon of interpretation is absolute. Each may be overcome
by the strength of differing principles that point on other directions.”).
251
Id. at 173.
252
Id. at 171, 173.
253
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
254
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
255
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
256
McCulloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”).
249
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cannot yet be drawn. To be thorough, then, courts and scholars should
utilize the key nondelegation question offered above in its entirety to
help ensure that latent historical discrepancies are not overlooked.
A final consideration regarding the key nondelegation question
applicable to Congress’ “appropriate legislation” powers concerns the
meaning of “enforce.” After all, each of those amendments vests in
Congress the “power to enforce [the amendment] by appropriate
legislation.” Is the use of the term “enforce” significant as it relates
Congress’ ability to delegate? Unlikely, but definitive answers will turn
on a more thorough review of the historical records associated with each
amendment.
It is widely accepted, for example, that the Reconstruction
Amendments provide Congress with the authority to “enforce” the
amendments’ protections by enacting broad, prophylactic measures.257
As Balkin explains, the Reconstruction Amendments empower Congress
to “do more” than “remedy past violations[,] . . . prevent future ones,” or
“find legislative facts to justify the remedies and the prospective
solutions it creates.”258 Referencing the Thirteenth Amendment as an
example, Balkin contends that the amendment gives Congress broad
authority to “disestablish all the institutions, practices, and customs
associated with slavery and make sure they can never rise up again.”259
Justice Thomas has also written of the broad scope of the powers vested
in Congress by Reconstruction Amendments.260 “The [Supreme] Court,”
Justice Thomas explained, has upheld legislation “on the view that the
Reconstruction Amendments give Congress the power ‘both to remedy
and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a
somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself
forbidden by the Amendment’s text.”261
It is possible, then, that the original public meanings of the
Reconstruction Amendments permit Congress to delegate discretion
relatively freely. After all, the Reconstruction Amendments were
enacted when federal troops were still dispatched to the southern
states.262 Permanently “disestablish[ing] . . . institutions, practices, and
customs”263 of slavery was (and is) a far-reaching task. The objective
reader at the time the Thirteenth Amendment was enacted might have
257

Balkin, supra note 218, at 1815.
Id.
259
Id. at 1817.
260
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 223–24,
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62, 81 (2000)).
261
Id.
262
Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commissions: The Forgotten Reconstruction
Chapter, 23 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 231, 237–38 (2008).
263
Balkin, supra note 218, at 1817.
258
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considered it unthinkable for Congress to accomplish such a far-reaching
task without delegating significant discretion to executive officials on the
ground. On the other hand, the thirty-ninth and fortieth Congresses were
often at odds with President Andrew Johnson when it came to
reconstruction policies.264 The objective reader during Reconstruction,
then, might have understood Congress as preferring to tightly control
reconstruction policies, not enact constitutional amendments allowing the
President to exercise broadly delegated powers.
This history only scratches the surface. But assume, arguendo, that
a thorough review of the historical records surrounding the
Reconstruction Amendments confirms that those amendments do indeed
permit Congress to delegate discretion relatively freely. Must it follow
that Congress can just as freely delegate its Twenty-Third Amendment
power to assign electoral votes in the District of Columbia?265 After all,
the Twenty-Third Amendment uses the same “enforce . . . by appropriate
legislation” language used in the Reconstruction Amendments.
My proposal to develop multiple nondelegation doctrines would
hold that Congress must not be automatically understood as having the
same ability to delegate different powers. Eradicating the effects of
slavery is a vast, society-wide effort; assigning electoral votes in a single
city is a comparatively smaller task. Both the Thirteenth and TwentyThird Amendments are important, but the mere fact that they each vest in
Congress a power to “enforce [the amendment] by appropriate
legislation” does not mean that Congress has the same ability to delegate
each power. The original public meaning of the Twenty-Third
Amendment might reasonably be understood as providing Congress with
less ability to delegate.
* * *
The awkward wording of the powers vested in Congress by the
“appropriate legislation” amendments has necessitated a rather
complicated analysis. To leverage the fruits of that analysis, courts
considering the constitutionality of a particular delegation of an
“appropriate legislation” power should structure their own analyses by
asking the key nondelegation question proposed above. Like all of the
key nondelegation questions proposed in this Article, the task is to
consider the scope of the relevant power – as understood by the correctly
positioned objective reader – and then ask whether the objective reader

264
Vagts, supra note 262, at 238; David P. Currie, The Reconstruction
Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 438 (“As early as January 1867, before the first
Reconstruction Act was adopted, no fewer than three resolutions were introduced in
the House urging that President Johnson be impeached.”); id. at 438–39 (noting that
the “crux” of one impeachment indictment was that “President Johnson had had the
gall to attempt to re-construct the former Confederate states on his own”).
265
US. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 2.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

47

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [2022], Art. 7

1286

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

in 1788 would have considered the delegation under review a “necessary
and proper” use of the power in question.

F. “By Law” Powers
A final set of congressional powers includes those stating that
Congress may provide for something “by law.” Some of the “by law”
powers vested in Congress are quite narrow. An initial review (unaided
by a full consideration of the historical records) suggests Congress has
little ability to delegate those powers. Consider the Twentieth
Amendment, which provides in part:
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such
meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they
shall by law appoint a different day.266

The ability for Congress to delegate that power seems limited.
Congress has the authority to change the time at which it shall convene,
but any exercise of that power must specify a precise day. 267 Selecting a
new day “of the President’s choosing,” for example, would seem
unlikely to satisfy the requirement that “they,” i.e., Congress, “appoint a
different day.”268
By comparison, other clauses within the Twentieth Amendment
seem to offer Congress the ability to delegate discretion more freely.
Consider two other provisions in the Twentieth Amendment, which
provide:
[Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment provides]: If a President
shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of
his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the
Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have
qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case
wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have
qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in
which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act
accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have
qualified.269
[Section 4 of the Twentieth Amendment provides]: The Congress
may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons
from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President
whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for
266

U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2 (emphasis added).
Id.
268
Id.
269
U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3 (emphasis added).
267
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the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate
may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have
devolved upon them.270

Pursuant to Section 3, Congress may either declare who shall act as
President, or declare “the manner in which one who is to act [as
President] shall be selected.”271 One can imagine an instance where “the
manner” Congress declares is a manner delegating significant discretion
to individuals outside of Congress, such as voters or election officials.
A natural reading of Section 4 seems to provide Congress with
similarly broad options. Section 4 is applicable when a candidate dies
while either the House or Senate is conducting a contingent election.272
Although Congress has never enacted legislation pursuant to Section 4,273
one can imagine Congress doing so by delegating broad discretion.
Congress might enact a law, for example, delegating significant
discretion to the political party of a deceased candidate, perhaps
declaring that “a dead vice-presidential candidate in the Senate . . . be
replaced by a new party nominee.”274 The importance of such a decision
(i.e., selecting the next Vice President) could be monumental.

270

U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 4 (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. amend. XX § 3.
272
A contingent election refers to those circumstances in which no
presidential candidate or no vice-presidential candidate receives a majority of votes
in the Electoral College. Brian C. Kalt, Of Death and Deadlocks: Section 4 of the
Twentieth Amendment, 54 HARV. J. LEG. 101, 104–05. For more on contingent
elections, see generally William Josephson, Senate Election of the Vice President
and House of Representatives Election of the President, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 597
(2009).
273
Kalt, supra note 272, at 103 (“But in all the years since 1933, Congress has
never even come close to using its Section 4 power to provide for candidate
substitutions.”).
274
Id. at 104 (proposing hypothetical legislation to be enacted pursuant to
Section 4 of the Twentieth Amendment).
Section 4 of the Twentieth Amendment is particularly interesting for purposes
of nondelegation because the provision constitutes a re-vesting of constitutional
power. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 4. The Twelfth Amendment vests a power in the
House to conduct a contingent election of the President and vests a power in the
Senate to conduct a contingent election of the Vice President. U.S. CONST. amend.
XII. As I noted at the start of Part III of this Article, powers vested in a single
chamber of Congress are not properly understood as powers vested in Congress.
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 135, at 1755. By vesting in Congress the power to
“provide for the case of the death” of a candidate in a contingent election, Section 4
of the Twentieth Amendment supplants powers originally vested in the House and
Senate as independent bodies. See Kalt, supra note 230, at 104 (“Section 4 is helpful
in one respect: it makes clear that the proper mechanism for resolving this mess is
legislation (as opposed to, say, a House rule).”).
271
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Nonetheless, Section 4 appears to empower Congress to freely delegate
the discretion to make potentially history-changing decisions.
Consider also two provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal
officers of the executive departments or of such other body as
Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President
shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as
Acting President.275
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the
powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a
majority of either the principal officers of the executive department
or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit
within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office.276

As the language quoted above indicates, the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment explicitly vests in Congress a power to establish a “body” to
determine an important policy question (i.e., the President’s fitness for
office).277 The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, then, explicitly permits
Congress to delegate significant discretion to others.278
Although Congress’ “by law” powers come primarily in
constitutional amendments, the same language appears in the
Constitution as it was ratified in 1788.279 For example, Article II,
Section 1, Clause 6 provides:
Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death,
Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President,
declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer

275

U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
277
THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45394, Presidential
Disability Under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Constitutional Provisions and
Perspectives for Congress, at (2018).
278
Id.
279
Id. at 1.
276
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shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.280

Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 provides:
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.281

And Article III provides:
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by
jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes
shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state,
the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law
have directed.282

Some of these powers have been altered by later amendments, and
they all (like every Congressional power) are vested with unique
language requiring independent examinations.283 Note, for example, that
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 includes an explicit reference to what
Congress “think[s] proper.”284 Such textual peculiarities must be
accounted for when developing power-specific nondelegation doctrines.
All of Congress’ “by law” powers, whether vested in an amendment
or the original Constitution, are subject to the Necessary and Proper
Clause.285 The key nondelegation question for all of Congress’ “by law”
powers is therefore as follows:
Key Nondelegation Question For Congress’ “By Law” Powers
Whether an objective reader in 1788 would have understood a
particular delegation to be a “necessary and proper” means of
“carrying into execution” a particular power, as that power was
understood by an objective reader at the time the power was ratified.
In considering the constitutionality of delegations made pursuant to
the category of “by law” powers vested by the original constitution, a
court need only consider the objective reader in 1788. For those “by
law” powers vested by latter amendments, the key nondelegation

280

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
282
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
283
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8.
284
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
285
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (applying to “all . . . powers vested by this
Constitution”).
281
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question again requires a bit of “time traveling,” similar to the key
nondelegation questions applicable to the Sixteenth Amendment and
Congress’ “appropriate legislation” powers.

IV. DEFENDING NONDELEGATION DOCTRINES
In the remainder of this Article, I offer three defenses of my
proposal to develop multiple nondelegation doctrines. First, I explain
how developing multiple nondelegation doctrines can lower the stakes of
enforcing nondelegation principles. Second, I respond to the anticipated
critique that creating multiple nondelegation doctrines will not avoid the
difficulty in creating a judicially manageable standard, but will instead
only splinter the problem by turning one unmanageable doctrine into
many unmanageable doctrines. Third, I argue that developing multiple
nondelegation doctrines makes a feature out of an alleged flaw in the
current nondelegation doctrine – namely, that the current doctrine is
riddled with exceptions.

A. Lowering the Stakes
Particularly following Gundy, the temperature of the debates
concerning the nondelegation doctrine has increased.286 In one camp are
those who see a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine as a way to rein in
an expansive federal government.287 In another camp are those who fear
that a revived nondelegation doctrine would spell disaster for the
administrative state.288 Unsurprisingly, these two camps see themselves
as diametrically opposed when it comes to nondelegation, and as existing
in a winner-take-all relationship. That need not be the case.
Multiple nondelegation doctrines can serve as a modus vivendi
between the two camps.289 Were a court to hold a particular delegation
286

See, e.g., Hannah Mullen & Sejal Singh, The Supreme Court Wants to
Revive a Doctrine That Would Paralyze Biden’s Administration, Slate (Dec. 1, 2020,
12:56
PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/12/supreme-court-gundydoctrine-administrative-state.html [https://perma.cc/5C9C-YWX2].
287
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133
HARV. L. REV. 852, 873, 900 (2020) (explaining the “administrative skeptic”
position on nondelegation).
288
See, e.g., id. at 869 (referring to the “[a]ministrative supremac[ist], who
“recognizes the authority of the legislature to delegate its lawmaking power to
administrative agencies”).
289
C.f. Squitieri, supra note 17, at 467–68 (arguing that the major questions
doctrine fails to similarly serve as a modus vivendi when it comes to reinvigorating
the nondelegation doctrine); Ilan Wurman, As-Applied Nondelegation, 96 TEX. L.
REV. 975, 976–77 (2018) [hereinafter Wurman, As-Applied] (“So much is at stake
by finding a statute in violation of the nondelegation doctrine that the Court simply
does not enforce it . . . .The nondelegation doctrine could be refashioned to avoid
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involving a particular power to be unconstitutional pursuant to one
nondelegation doctrine, it need not follow that the same result would
apply to another delegation involving other powers. Thus, courts need
not bludgeon nearly one hundred years of post-New Deal legislation with
a single nondelegation doctrine, nor need they ignore clear nondelegation
problems out of a fear that correcting those problems will lead to
unmanageably wide consequences.
Instead, courts can address
nondelegation issues more precisely by developing multiple
nondelegation doctrines.

B. Judicially Manageable Standards
As described in Part II, the intelligible principle test has failed to
produce a judicially manageable standard.290 A skeptical reader might
argue that developing multiple nondelegation doctrines will do little to
correct that failure. Pursuant to that critique, developing multiple
nondelegation doctrines might be thought to only worsen the situation by
requiring courts to grapple with multiple (if smaller) unmanageable
standards. This critique fails to appreciate that the judicial task involved
in the nondelegation doctrines I propose are different in kind than the
task required by the intelligible principle test (as well as the task
presented by the important subject test).
In applying the intelligible principle test, courts seek to determine
how “intelligible” a principle must be in order to qualify as “intelligible”
enough.291 This inquiry boils down to something of an unrestrained
judicial gut check, in which courts are asked to determine how much
delegated discretion is too much delegated discretion.292 As Justice
Scalia correctly noted in Mistretta, that inquiry concerns “a debate not
over a point of principle but over a question of degree.” 293 Article III
courts are ill-suited to decide such questions.294

this problem and to become workable—it could be fashioned into an as-applied
doctrine.”).
290
See supra Part II.B.
291
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 372 (1989).
292
See Coglianese, supra note 162, at 1879 (“Judgment calls like these,
completely untethered from anything but perhaps the judge’s own gut instincts,
would indeed prove unworkable if not also unwise.”); Wurman, As-Applied, supra
note 189, at 981 (“Nondelegation’s guiding principle is therefore discretion, and a
statute either confers the requisite intelligible principle or it does not. The doctrine
is exceedingly difficult to administer, which partly explains why the Court has only
invoked the doctrine twice in its history.”) (internal citations omitted).
293
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415–16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
294
See Squitieri, supra note 17, at 495–513 (arguing that the judicial power
does not permit courts to definitively decide questions of policy).
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Under my proposal, there would still be some need for courts to
exercise discretion. But this is only because “a certain degree of
discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial
action.”295 Courts are regularly asked to decide, for example, whether a
sculpture constitutes protected “speech,”296 or whether downloading files
from a computer constitutes a “search[]” or “seizure[]” of “papers” or
“effects.”297 The intelligible principle test (as well as the important
subjects test) enlarges this type of discretion, which is inherent in
exercising the judicial duty to say what the law is.298 “Speech” and
“search[]” are actual words in the Constitution; they can interpreted in
relation to the rest of the Constitution and relevant history. “Intelligible
principle” and “important subjects,” on the other hand, are judicial dicta
ungrounded from the Constitution’s text. The relative benefit of my
proposal, then, is that it curtails the discretion necessarily exercised by
courts because courts would be required to hue closely to text and
history.299
As John Manning argues, “constitutional values do not . . . exist in
the abstract.”300 Instead, “constitutional values . . . find concrete
expression in many discrete constitutional provisions, which prescribe
the means of implementing the value in question.”301 The Constitution,
for example, does not embrace a freestanding conception of
federalism.302 Rather, “federalism is implemented by a number of
constitutional provisions that divide and structure the relationships

295

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
297
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
298
See Rappaport, Two Tiered, supra note 60, at 2. (referring to the important
subjects test as “pretty indeterminate”); but see Meet Mr. Marshall, supra note 130
(manuscript at 8) (arguing that the important subjects test likely incorporates
historical private-law principles regarding delegation, and thus courts need not “run
away from Chief Justice Marshall’s [important subjects] inquiry,” but should instead
“flesh out its private-law background, which does not leave judges free to roam
through their personal preferences”).
299
See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 212, at 967 (“[A] smaller
construction zone means that more of constitutional law is anchored in the
Constitution’s original meaning.”).
300
John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 399, 404 (2010) [hereinafter Clear Statement Rules]; see also John F.
Manning, The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (2013)
(referring to “new structuralism” which “rests on freestanding principles of
federalism and separation of powers”).
301
Clear Statement Rules, supra note 300, at 404.
302
Id. at 434.
296
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between federal and state governments in rather particular ways.”303
Nondelegation principles should be treated similarly.
The Constitution does not invite courts to interpret a vague, onesized-fits-all theory of federalism or nondelegation. Instead, the
Constitution lays out a series of provisions promoting those concepts.
Similar to how it would be improper for a court to enforce federalism at a
level “that is abstracted to an unhelpful level of generality,” 304 courts
should refrain from seeking to enforce a vague conception of
nondelegation that is unmoored from the Constitution’s text. And to
state the obvious, judicial dicta speaking to “intelligible” principles and
“important” subjects does not qualify as constitutional text.305 Rather
than continue to treat judicial dicta as if it existed on a plain higher than
the Constitution, courts should focus on constitutional provisions, the
original meanings of which speak to how Congress may delegate
particular powers.

C. A Feature, Not a Flaw
Finally, a third defense of my proposal is that it makes a feature of
what might otherwise be perceived as a flaw in current nondelegation
doctrine. There are a variety of circumstances, grounded in history,
where the intelligible principle test does not apply with full force.306
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy highlights two such circumstances.307
303

Id.; see also Harrison, Enumerated Federal Power and the Necessary and
Proper Clause, supra note 139, at 1110 (“The Federal Convention largely invented
constitutional federalism, the accompanying principle of limited federal power, and
the particular implementation of that principle through a specific enumeration of
authority.”).
304
Clear Statement Rules, supra note 300, at 434.
305
See also Rappaport, Two Tiered, supra note 60, at 14 (referring to Chief
Justice Marshal’s reference to important subjects as “dicta”).
306
These circumstances went unaccounted for in Skinner v. Mid-America
Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989). In Skinner, the Court cursorily wrote that neither
“the text of the Constitution [n]or the practices of Congress require the application of
a different and stricter nondelegation doctrine in cases where Congress delegates
discretionary authority to the Executive under its taxing power.” Id. at 222–23. In
doing so the Court rejected an invitation to create a “two-tiered” nondelegation
doctrine, and “h[e]ld that the delegation of discretionary authority under Congress’
taxing power is subject to no constitutional scrutiny greater than that we have
applied to other nondelegation challenges.” Id. at 220, 223.
Properly understood, the “hold[ing]” in Skinner is not inconsistent with my
proposal. True, the Court held that Congress’ power to tax was not subject to a
uniquely strict nondelegation inquiry. Id. at 223. But that holding need not be
extended to mean that no power is subject to a stricter nondelegation inquiry. Id.
222–23. To the extent that the Court suggested otherwise, it was wrong, and did so
only in dicta. Id. at 224. Certainly, the Skinner holding could not be understood as
addressing Congress’ ability to delegate other powers, as those powers were not at
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First are those delegations concerning authority already exercisable
by the President as a result of his foreign affairs powers.308 As Justice
Gorsuch noted, “when a congressional statute confers wide discretion to
the executive, no separation-of-powers problem may arise if ‘the
discretion is to be exercised over matters already within the scope of
executive power.’”309 Thus, a “foreign-affairs-related statute . . . may be
an example of this kind of permissible lawmaking, given that many
foreign affairs powers are constitutionally vested in the president under
Article II.”310
The second set of circumstances addressed by Justice Gorsuch was
that concerning the judiciary’s power to structure its own internal
procedures.311 In those circumstances, “the same principle” justifying a
less stringent application of the intelligent principle test “applied to the
judiciary.”312 To support this proposition, Justice Gorsuch cited
Wayman, and wrote that “[e]ven in the absence of any statute, courts
have the power under Article III ‘to regulate their practice.’”313
Scholars have offered similar examples.314 Perhaps most notable is
Michael Rappaport, who catalogues a variety of circumstances where
nondelegation principles apply with differing levels of force.315 In his
most recent contribution, which builds off of his earlier work,316
Rappaport proposes a two-tiered nondelegation doctrine – one lenient

issue in the case. Id. at 221. Indeed, it was only in passing that the Court suggested
which of Congress’ two taxing powers was even at issue. Id. at 220 (referring to
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1). And the Court offered no response to the historical
evidence addressed in Part IV.B concerning the multiple instances in which the
intelligible principle test applies with less force to delegations of certain powers. Id.
at 218–19.
307
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2145 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
308
Id. at 2137.
309
Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting David Schoenbrod, The Delegation
Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1260
(1985)).
310
Id. (internal citation omitted).
311
Id.; see also Rappaport, Two Tiered, supra note 60, at 7 n.18 (referring to
“the internal administration of the executive and the courts”).
312
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
313
Id. (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
314
See, e.g., Wurman, As-Applied, supra note 289, at 1007 n.174 (collecting
sources addressing the application of nondelegation principles to private conduct and
the creation of legally binding rules); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 212, at 950
(referring to “specific areas, such as foreign and military affairs, where the executive
historically enjoyed much greater discretion”).
315
See, e.g., The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 131;
Rappaport, Two Tiered, supra note 60.
316
The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 131.
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and one strict.317 In the lenient tier, “the Constitution imposes a lenient
test as to delegation – either one that places no limits or weaker limits on
the delegation of policymaking discretion.”318 The lenient tier is
applicable to those “traditional areas of executive responsibility, such as
foreign and military affairs, spending, and the management of
government property” where “the Constitution allows for significant
delegation of policymaking discretion.”319 By contrast, the strict tier
applies to “other areas – which can be roughly summarized as rules that
regulate citizens as to their private rights in the domestic sphere,” where
“the Constitution imposes a strict prohibition on such delegation.”320
As these examples show, nondelegation principles are regularly
applied differently to different powers.321 These examples might be
thought of as a flaw – i.e., unprincipled “exceptions” to a single
nondelegation doctrine. More charitably, they might be conceptualized
(as Rappaport would have it) as evidence of a “strict” and “lenient”
version of a single nondelegation doctrine. I posit, however, that a better
way to conceptualize these examples is to acknowledge them as the
beginnings of different nondelegation doctrines, each applicable to
different congressional powers. Thus, these examples are not flaws in
need of being explained away; they are features to be embraced. And
these features should be nurtured and given the opportunity to bloom, so
that, over time, they may develop into a matured set of historically
focused, textually derived nondelegation doctrines.

V. CONCLUSION
When discussing the nondelegation doctrine, courts and scholars
frequently speak of Congress’ “legislative power.” The Constitution,
however, speaks of no such thing. Instead, the Constitution vests in
Congress a collection of different powers (plural) – many of which are
hardly “legislative” at all. In this Article, I have argued that the
nondelegation doctrine should be transformed into a series of multiple
nondelegation doctrines, each corresponding to one of Congress’ distinct
powers. Doing so can transform a failed doctrine – which calls on courts
to make vague policy determinations – into a more textually-derived

317

Rappaport, Two Tiered, supra note 60, at 2.
Id.
319
Id.
320
Id.
321
See also id. n.26 (noting that “James Madison wrote that the delegation
prohibition applied ‘especially [to] a law which personal liberty is invaded, property
deprived of its value to the owner, and life itself indirectly exposed to danger’)
(quoting 4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 560 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (emphasis added).
318
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series of doctrines better positioned to ensure that Congress does not
unconstitutionally delegate its powers.
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